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ACCOMMODATION OF INDIAN TREATY
RIGHTS IN AN INTERNATIONAL FISHERY:
AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM BEGGING
FOR AN INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

The anadromous fish resources of the Pacific Northwest' have
been threatened for decades by an oversized fleet and by regulatory
complexities and uncertainties. 2 In recent years they have been subjected to the additional burdens of unlawful and lawful resistance to
implementation of U.S. District Judge George H. Boldt's 1974 decision in United States v. Washington3 regarding Indian fishing rights.
1. Anadromous fish are those which ascend the rivers of their birth from the sea for
breeding. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 76 (14th ed. 1961).
Salmon and steelhead trout are among the anadromous fish native to the Pacific Northwest. J. TOMASEVICH, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON CONSERVATION OF MARINE RE-

SOURCES 221 (1943).
2. See Part II-B-2 infra.
3. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied 423 U.S. 1086 (1976). Judge Boldt's decision construed the Indians' off-reservation treaty fishing rights reserved to them in the Stevens treaties, listed in note 5 infra, as
entitling them to the opportunity to take up to 50% of the harvestable number offish returning to their traditional fishing grounds. 384 F. Supp. at 343. To account for harvest
of fish by nontreaty fishermen outside the jurisdiction of the State of Washington, the
district court added an "equitable adjustment" to its definition of the harvestable number of fish on which the Indian share is based. Id. at 344. This "equitable adjustment"
compensates treaty Indians for the opportunity lost when fish are taken before they
reach the Indians' "usual and accustomed fishing places." Id.
Unlawful opposition to Judge Boldt's decision has ranged from destruction of Indian
fishing gear to hostilities between non-Indian fishermen and enforcement officials. See,
e.g., Man Convicted of Violating Indian Rights, Seattle Times, Mar. 30, 1978, § B, at
10; Angry Fishermen Protest During Ford's Visit, Seattle Times, Oct. 25, 1976, § A, at
1 (fisherman shot by enforcement official when it appeared fisherman's boat was ramming enforcement vessel); Injured Gillnetter's Suit Settled for $250,000, Seattle Times,
Oct. 10, 1978, § D, at 8. It has included a history of violating the court orders. See, e.g.,
State 'Powerless' to Stop Illegal Fishing,Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Aug. 3 1, 1977, § A,
at 16; Boldt Raps 'Outlaw' Non-Indian Fishing, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 28,
1975, § A, at 3.
Much lawful opposition has been funneled into the federal and state courts. See Puget
Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978); Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 89 Wn. 2d 276, 571 P.2d 1173 (1977), cert. granted sub nom.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S. Ct.
276 (1978); Puget Sound Gilinetters Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 677, 565 P.2d 1151
(1977), cert. granted sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978); Washington State Commercial Passenger
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The resistance has come not only from non-Indian commercial fishermen, but also from the Canadian government and the International
Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission 4 (the Commission). Consequently, the efforts of the United States to incorporate the Indian
treaty rights into the regulations of the Commission have failed.
The United States faces a dilemma which results from having treaties with two different signatories, Canada and native Northwest Indians, with respect to the same subject matter. After promising the Indians an opportunity to catch fifty percent of the harvestable fish
returning to their traditional fishing grounds,5 the United States enFishing Vessel Ass'n v. Tollefson, 87 Wn. 2d 417, 553 P.2d 113 (1976), cert. granted sub
nora. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n. 99
S. Ct. 276 (1978); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe. Inc.. 86 Wn. 2d 664. 548
P.2d 1058 (1976). vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 165 (1977). This volume of opposition has led the Ninth Circuit to comment:
Agencies of the State of Washington and various of its constituencies continue to
attack the judgment in United States v. Washington....
Except for some desegregation cases .... the district court has faced the most concerted official and private
efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d at 1126.
Opposition has also been expressed through legislative channels in efforts to modify
or abrogate the Indian treaty rights. H.R. 9054, 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1977). See Cunningham Continues Attack on Boldt Decision, Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Oct. 28. 1977,
§ A, at 10; Fishing Plea Fails; Next Stop, Congress, Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Jan. 27.
1976, § A, at 1.
Lawful opposition has also taken the form of protest demonstrations. See, e.g.,
Sportsmen Rise up on Rights, Seattle Post-Intelligencer. Oct. 28. 1977, § A, at 10; Angry Fishermen Protest During Ford's Visit, Seattle Times, Oct. 25. 1976, § A, at 1.
4. Canada has resisted implementation of the decree in United States v. Washington
through its three members on the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission.
This resistance plagued U.S. implementation efforts in each of the past four seasons. See
notes 65, 76. 83, 101 & 117 and accompanying text infra.
5. 384 F. Supp. at 343 (construction of the Stevens treaties). The Stevens treaties
are a series of similarly worded treaties entered into with various Indian tribes throughout what is now the State of Washington. Treaty with the Nisqually and Other Indian
Tribes, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132 (Treaty of Medicine Creek); Treaty with the
Duwamish and Other Indian Tribes, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat. 927 (Treaty of Point Elliott); Treaty with the S'klallam and Other Indian Tribes, Jan. 28, 1855, 12 Stat. 933
(Treaty of Point No Point); Treaty with the Makah Tribe, Jan. 31, 1855, 12 Stat. 939
(Treaty of Neah Bay); Treaty with the Yakima and Other Indian Tribes, June 9, 1855,
12 Stat. 951 (Treaty of Camp Stevens); Treaty with the Quinaielt and Other Indian
Tribes, July 1, 1855, 12 Stat. 971 (Treaty of Quinaielt River). Typical treaty language
providing for Indian fishing rights states that " [t] he right of taking fish, at all usual and
accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all
citizens of the Territory ....
Treaty with the Nisqually and Other Indian Tribes, art.
III, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133 (Treaty of Medicine Creek). Judge Boldt, in applying rules of construction applicable to Indian treaties, construed "in common with"
according to its common dictionary meaning, i.e., sharing equally. United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974). See also id. at 356.

404

Accommodation of Indian Treaty Rights
tered into a treaty with Canada providing for joint management of the
fishery through the Commission.6 While proving extremely beneficial
to the health of the resource, 7 this joint management scheme has
proven to be an impediment to the fulfillment of the obligations of the
United States to its treaty Indians.
As guardian or trustee of the Indian treaty rights,8 the United States
must make good faith efforts to secure these rights in the international
fishery. But the subject matter of these rights, the fish resource, is dependent on the success of joint United States-Canadian management
of the salmon runs under the Commission's jurisdiction. Thus, it is
imperative that the Indian treaty rights be implemented without jeopardizing the spirit of cooperation essential to the Commission's successful management. 9
6. Convention Concerning Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System,
May 26, 1930, United States-Canada, 50 Stat. 1355 [hereinafter cited as Sockeye Convention], as amended by Protocol to the Sockeye Convention, December 28, 1956,
United States-Canada, [ 1957] 8 U.S.T. 1058 [hereinafter cited as Pink Salmon Protocol]. For the full text of the treaty, as amended to 1974, with additional- commentary,
see LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES, OCEANOGRAPHIC RESOURCES AND WILDLIFE TO

WHICH THE UNITED STATES IS A PARTY 654-75 (Comm. Print 1974) (prepared for Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.).
The Pink Salmon Protocol amended the Sockeye Convention by placing pink salmon
within the jurisdiction of the Sockeye Convention. Where operation of the Convention
has been amended by the Pink Salmon Protocol, reference will be made to the specific
provisions. Except for such instances of specific amendment, future references to the
Sockeye Convention include pink salmon.
The Sockeye Convention was not a self-executing treaty and, by Article X, the United
States was obligated to enact domestic legislation implementing the Convention. Sockeye Convention, supra at 1359. The United States Congress passed legislation for this
purpose, the Sockeye Salmon Fishery Act of 1947, ch. 345, 61 Stat. 511 (1947), which
was amended to include pink salmon by Act of July 11, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-102, 71
Stat. 293. This implementing legislation is codified in 16 U.S.C. §§ 776-776f (1976).
7. See note 49 infra.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (183 1) (dictum); Message of President Nixon to Congress on
Indian Affairs, [1970] PuB. PAPERS 564, 565-66 (July 8, 1970); Hearings on S. 2035
before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Interiorand Insular
Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 22, 197 1) (statement of Rogers C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior). United States v. Washington was brought by the United States "on
its own behalf and as trustee" for the Indian tribes. 384 F. Supp. at 327.
In general, the courts have not attempted to define precisely the nature of the special
responsibilities assumed by the United States in treaties and statutes. United States v.
Seminole Nation, 173 F. Supp. 784 (Ct. Cl. 1959), is typical: "Whatever the expression
or term used, the relationship is one founded upon a distinctive obligation of trust." Id.
at 790. For a similar view, see Oneida Tribe v. United States, 165 Ct. Cl. 487, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 946 (1964). Without attempting to arrive at a precise definition, further
references to this special responsibility will be in terms of "trustee."
9. As stated by Circuit Judge Kennedy, "The State and, absent its cooperation, the
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This comment will analyze the relative success of the various approaches taken to implement Indian treaty rights in the international
fishery. It will discuss the domestic litigation resulting from these
approaches and will identify the key legal issues involved. Finally, it
will suggest possible means of resolving the dilemma in which the
United States currently finds itself. By providing an appreciation of
both the scientific complexities of managing this valuable resource
and the limitations on unilateral judicial efforts in the United States, it
will become apparent that the solution to this sensitive problem rests
not in unilateral, but in cooperative United States-Canadian efforts.
Only through diplomatic negotiations can we be assured that these recently resurrected Indian treaty rights will be accommodated in harmony with the conservation and enhancement of the salmon resource.
It is hoped that the two national governments will come to realize the
role of cooperation and act to avoid imposing upon the resource and
its beneficiaries the futility of future summers in court.
II.

MANAGEMENT OF THE FRASER RIVER FISHERIES

A.

Pre-Convention Separate Management and Resource Depletion

By their nature, the great majority of the sockeye and pink salmon
returning to spawn in the Fraser River pass through the Strait of Juan
de Fuca and northern Puget Sound waters. 10 Vulnerable to the commercial fishing fleets of both the United States and Canada, the
fishery has always posed an international problem."' Prior to the es-

federal courts, must protect the fishing resource in a manner that respects the rights of
the treaty parties." Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d
1123, 1136 (9th Cir. 1978) (concurring opinion). This reflects the importance of preserving the resource as opposed to the parties' interest in harvesting the resource.
10. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, THE PACIFIC SALMON FISHERIES 122 (1969);
D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 384 (1965); [1944] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 5 (1945). These Fraser River sockeye salmon
form the basis for the most prosperous fishery in the Puget Sound-Gulf of Georgia region. Id.
I1. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 122. Virtually all of the
sockeye salmon taken in this fishery spawn in the Fraser River system. Id. See also D.
JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 384 & n.82. As the fish passed through the waters of the
State of Washington enroute to the Fraser, they were subject to the jurisdiction of the
state. During the latter part of their migration when the fish were in Canadian waters,
they were subject to the exclusive legislative authority of the Canadian Parliament. Id.
Thus, no one body was responsible for management of the fishery. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G.
PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 131.
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tablishment of the Commission by the Sockeye Convention, 12 there
was no single body charged with research concerning and management of this valuable salmon resource.
Separate Canadian and United States management proved incompatible with the effective conservation and management of this resource, 13 and the abundance of fish available in the early days of the
commercial fishery showed signs of drastic depletion by 1917.14 As it
became increasingly apparent that rational management depended
upon a joint system of regulations that would cover the whole fishery,
the two countries intensified treaty negotiations. 15 But it was not until

12. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1356. The composition, duties, powers,
and management problems of the Commission are discussed in Part II-B infra.
13. This basic principle of rejecting separate fishery management was recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in reference to claims of Indian sovereignty over
the off-reservation fishing rights of its members. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556
(1916). It applies equally to managing the Fraser River fish resources. The Court said
that" [s] uch a duality of sovereignty, instead of maintaining in each the essential power
of preservation, would in fact deny it to both." Id. at 563. "Divided authority over the
sockeye-salmon fishery of the Fraser River system proved one of the hardest obstacles
barring a rational system of regulation, and hence one of the major causes of its farreaching depletion." J. TOMASEVICH, supra note I, at 235. One reason for the failure of
separate management is the tendency for the two agencies to pursue different regulatory
philosophies, especially when scientific knowledge of the resource is lacking. These instances of competing philosophies are often the result of different gear-types being favored by the two regulating agencies. Id. at 242-47. The attitude of the fishermen of the
two countries also detracts from the effectiveness of any regulations because, in the environment of separate management, "fishermen of either side are inclined to operate to
the limit when the fish are in their waters and place the responsibility for untoward
results on those of the other country." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT OF THE AMERICANCANADIAN FISHERIES CONFERENCE OF 1918, at 24 (1920), quoted in J. ToMASEVICH, su-

pra note 1, at 242-43.
14. Since the life cycle of the sockeye and pink salmon is four years, any trends in
the run sizes must be determined by comparing the runs every fourth year. Thus, the
1913 cycle compares with the runs in 1917, 1921, 1925, 1929, etc. See [1945] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 8 (1946). By 1917, the serious decline in the
sockeye fisheries was evident. [1960] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP.

3 (1961); 80 CONG. REC. 9580 (1936). The market for pink salmon had not fully developed by 1917, and although meaningful catch data from these early years of the pink
salmon fishery is not available, the decline of the pink salmon runs had also occurred by
1917. [1957] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 21, 32 (1958). See also
J. ToMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 240.

15. Although the first joint study of the fishery in 1892 pronounced it to be in
healthy condition, the failure of certain expected runs in the "big run" years that had occurred every fourth year led to other efforts at coming to an agreement on joint control.
These efforts intensified after the failure of the 1917 "big run" to appear as expected on

the basis of the record 1913 brood year run. See generally J. TomAsEvicH, supra note 1,
at 250-56.
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the Sockeye Convention was ratified in 1937 that forty-five years of
16
effort to establish joint control reached fruition.
B.

The Sockeye Convention and Commission Management

1.

The Commission: Its duties, powers, and limitations

The stated purpose of the Sockeye Convention is the protection,
preservation, and extension of the sockeye and pink salmon fisheries
in the Fraser River system, which in the years prior to the Convention
had been greatly depleted. 17 To this end, the two nations agreed to establish and maintain a Commission consisting of six members, three
from the United States and three from Canada. t8
16. D. JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 385; [1946] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 9-10 (1947). The previous efforts were blocked in part by the reluc-

tance of the State of Washington to give up its right to regulate its fisheries without federal interference. J. TOMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 253. The official opposition to the
Sockeye Convention, as voiced by Governor Hartley, was based primarily on the principle of state rights versus federal interference. Id. at 259. But it is likely that the real
underlying factors were the desire to obtain more than the 50% share allocated each
country by the terms of the Sockeye Convention and opposition to the inclusion in the
Convention jurisdiction "of the high seas where the U.S. purse seiners fished for sockeye
without restriction and enjoyed a special advantage." Id. Desire for a greater share of
the catch was not surprising because the U.S. catch exceeded the Canadian catch prior to
1935. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 140. In deference to the

Washington opposition, the United States Senate refused to advise ratification of the
Sockeye Convention without inclusion of three understandings. Id. at 142; [ 1946] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 10 (1947). See note 26 infra. Canadian approval of the Sockeye Convention came within four days of its May 26, 1930, signing.
Act Respecting Sockeye Convention, May 30, 1930, 20 & 21 Geo. 5, c. 10 (present version codified in CAN. REV. STAT. c. F-16 (1970)). U.S. approval, however, was delayed
for seven years. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1355. Joint control was further
delayed because the second understanding denied the Commission any regulatory powers for an additional eight years. Id. at 1360. In effect, the Washington opposition delayed implementation of the joint regulation contemplated by the Sockeye Convention
for 15 years. SeeJ. TOMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 48, 250-56.
17. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1355. The Convention emphasizes that
this purpose is to be pursued through "joint effort and expense." Id. at 1358 (emphasis
added).
18. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1356. The Commissioners are appointed
by their respective national governments and the duration of their office is "during the
pleasure of the [nation] by which they were appointed." Id. at 1356-57. This provision
reflects the desire of both nations to retain their sovereignty over the fishery rather than
vest it in the Commission. See note 31 infra. The treaty provides that "It] he Commission shall continue in existence so long as this Convention shall continue in force,"
Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357, and the duration of the Convention is stated
to be "for a period of sixteen years, and thereafter until one year from the day on which
either [nation] shall give notice to the other of its desire to terminate it." Id. at 1360.
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The Convention limits the authority of the Commission to specifically defined Convention waters. 19 It provides for a thorough investigation of the natural history of the sockeye and pink salmon. 20 The
Commission is authorized to conduct fish cultural. operations and, in
aid of such operations, to improve streams, establish and maintain
hatcheries, recommend the removal of obstructions to salmon migration, and to use any other measures that may be required for the restoration of the depleted runs. In these investigative and scientific func21
tions, the Commission is given wide discretion.

The Commission's regulatory authority is not so broad or so clearly
defined as its scientific and investigative authority. The Commission
is empowered to issue regulations, but they must be affirmed by two
of the three Commissioners of each country. 22 Further, all such
regulations are subject to the approval of the respective governments 23 with the exception of adjustments and emergency orders required to carry out the provisions of the Convention.2 4 It is unclear
19. Id. at 1357. Convention waters include the territorial waters and high seas adjacent to British Columbia and the State of Washington between the 48th and 49th parallels, the Strait of Juan de Fuca, the Strait of Georgia as far north as Lasqueti Island, and
the Fraser River as far as Mission, British Columbia. Id. at 1355-56. See map in rear
pocket of [1945] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. (1946).
20. The Commission is directed to "make a thorough investigation into the natural
history of the Fraser River sockeye salmon, into hatchery methods, spawning ground
conditions and other related matters." Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357 (emphasis added).
21. The Sockeye Convention states:
[I] t shall have power to improve spawning grounds, construct, and maintain
hatcheries, rearing ponds and other such facilities as it may determine to be necessary for the propagation of sockeye salmon in any of the waters covered by this
Convention, and to stock any such waters with sockeye salmon by such methods as
it may determine to be most advisable.
Id. (emphasis added). See also J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 142.
22. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1358.
23. Pink Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, at 1060. Although approval of the two national governments was not required by the terms of the Sockeye Convention prior to
the 1956 amendment, Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357, it was the accepted
practice. [1953] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1954). Established

practice has been for the Commission to promulgate separate regulations for fishing in
U.S. waters and Canadian waters and then to request approval of those regulations by
the government of the country to which they apply. Neither the Commission nor the parties to the treaty have interpreted the Convention to require approval of one country for
the regulations pertaining to fishing in the other country. Affidavit of Mary Elizabeth
Hoinkes, Ass't Legal Adviser for Oceans, Environment & Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dep't
of State (Apr. 14, 1978) & Affidavit of Donald R. Johnson, Chairman of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (Apr. 10, 1978), Record on Appeal at 3236, United States v. Marriott, No. 78-1987 (9th Cir., argued Jan. 10, 1979).
24. Pink Salmon Protocol, supranote 6, at 1060.

409

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:403, 1979

whether this latter clause grants the Commission the power to act at
its discretion without governmental approval.2 5 Regulatory authority
is further limited by the three understandings added to the Conven26
tion to obtain Senate ratification.
25. If the exercise of this emergency power is at the absolute discretion of the Commission, it would seem to render nugatory the requirement of governmental approval of
all regulations contained earlier in the very same sentence of the treaty. See Pink
Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, at 1060. However. such a broad interpretation of the
emergency power is not without support. See D. JOHNSTON. supra note 10, at 389 n.97
(1965). The Commission has apparently shared this broad view, as evidenced by its actions in 1976 and 1977. See notes 101 & 117 infra. A more reasonable interpretation
would limit the exercise of the emergency power to those situations in which an adjustment of the government-approved annual regulations is necessary in response to variations from the expected run size and timing, and adjustment cannot wait for the procedure of obtaining governmental approval.
26. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1360. By the first understanding, the
Commission is denied the power to authorize the use of any type of gear contrary to the
laws of the State of Washington or the Dominion of Canada. Id. This was a concession
granted the State of Washington to defer to the judgment of the people of Washington.
who had only a few years before outlawed the use of"fish traps" by the passage of Initiative 77. See generally J.CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 137.
By the second understanding, the Commission was denied any regulatory authority
for the first two cycles (eight years) of the Convention. See note 16 supra.
By the third understanding, the Commission was required to set up an Advisory Committee composed of five persons from each country representing various branches of the
fishing industry. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6. at 1360. The Commission is required to afford the Advisory Committee "full opportunity to examine and to be heard
on all proposed orders, regulations or recommendations." Id. The size of the Advisory
Committee was increased to six persons from each country by the Pink Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, at 1060. Newly appointed Advisory Committee members serve a
four-year term with reappointment subject to review by the Commission. [ 1970] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1971). The Advisory Committee serves
the purpose of keeping the Commission in close touch with the industry and its needs
and problems. J. TOMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 57. This furthers observance of regulations by fishermen and cooperation between the Commission and the industry without
which a conservation program in fisheries could hardly succeed or endure. Id. The Advisory Committee exerts some influence on the Commission's eventual regulations.
[1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1978) (U.S. proposal to in-

corporate directly special treaty Indian fishing regulations tabled by Commission after
unanimous opposition of Advisory Committee); Notes of an Interview with Donald R.
Johnson, Chairman of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, in Seattle, Washington, at 4 (Feb. 14, 1978) (approved by Donald R. Johnson) (on file with
Washington Law Review). See also note 110 infra.
The U.S. Commissioners were instructed to seek appointment of a treaty Indian to
the Advisory Committee to provide representation of the treaty Indians. Letter from
William L. Sullivan, Jr., to Donald R. Johnson at 2 (Oct. 1,1974) (on file with Washington Law Review). Although no such appointment has occurred to date, Notes of an Interview with Donald R. Johnson, supra at 3, the United States has secured Canadian approval of an increase in the size of the Advisory Committee, 76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425
(1977). This newly created vacancy could be used to provide representation on the
Advisory Committee to treaty Indians without denying it to a presently represented segment of the non-Indian fleet.
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In practice, the Commission's recommended regulations are promulgated prior to the season based on Commission estimates of the
expected size, timing, optimum escapement, and allowable catch of
each race.27 They are generally formalized prior to the time when the
industry must prepare for the coming fishing season. 28 As the season
develops, variations in the timing and size of the migrations of the
various races often require the Commission to exercise its emergency

29
regulatory power to attain its primary goal of proper escapement.

goal of a
Emergency orders are also issued to realize the secondary
30
fifty-fifty split of the harvest between the two nations.
In creating the Commission, the two nations were careful to preserve their sovereignty. 3 1 This is evident in, among other things, the
2"7. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 143. See also note 41 infra.
These recommended regulations are no more than proposals until accepted by the respective governments. See note 23 supra and note 119 infra.
28. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 143. The Commission has
explained:
Prediction, six months or more in advance, of the number of sockeye and pink
salmon expected to return to the Fraser River has become an expected function of
management. The forecast serves as a basis for formulating fishing regulations, but
it is also used by the fishing industry and its suppliers to plan operations.
[1973] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 29 (1974). This advance notice allows commercial fishermen to assess whether or not another coastal fishery might
be more profitable. [1964] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 11
(1965); [ 1954] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1955).
The diplomatic meetings surrounding the 1976 and 1977 recommended annual regulations delayed Commission adoption for about five weeks in 1976 and about four
months in 1977. Compare Affidavit of Kathryn Clark-Bourne, Record, vol. 1, doc. no.
5, attachment 3, at 3 (filed June 27, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 1M (W.D. Wash. 1977) (Commission adoption of
1977 recommendations on June 1) and [ 1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N
ANN. REP. 4 (1977) (Commission adoption of 1976 recommendations on March 4) with,
e.g., [1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP 6 (1975) (Commission
adoption of 1974 recommendations on February 1).
29. The issuance of emergency orders facilitates the day-by-day management requirements inherent in this complex fishery. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra
note 10, at 144. See, e.g., [1969] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 1217 (1970).
30. The Sockeye Convention contemplated regulation with "a view to allowing, as
nearly as may be practicable, an equal portion of the fish that may be caught each year
to be taken by the fishermen of each [country] ." Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at
1358-59 (emphasis added). From both this text and the actions of the Commission, it is
clear that the goal of equal division of catch is secondary to the requirements of proper
escapement. [1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1975); [1950]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 27 (1951); [1944] INT'L PAC. SALMON

FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 23 (1945). See also J. ToMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 5354.
31. The two nations were careful to retain control over their Commissioners, see
note 18 supra, and the regulations, see note 23 supra.Also, in agreeing to fund the Coin-
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enforcement scheme which places the sole responsibility for enforcing
Commission regulations on the two national governments. 32 As a result of its narrow political powers, the Commission has consistently
limited its concerns to its stated purpose of preserving, protecting, and
extending the salmon resource 33 and has avoided involvement in
other "political" issues except when they have posed a threat to the
34
Fraser River salmon.
mission's activities, the two nations retained additional control. They agreed to divide
equally the costs of the Commission, but in the very same provision agreed only "to appropriate annually such money as each may deem desirable for such work in the light of
the reports of the Commission." Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357 (emphasis
added). This effectively reduces the level of the Commission's activities to that deemed
desirable by the country providing the lesser annual funding. [ 1939] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 (1940). These and other limitations have been recognized by the Commission as being "[i] n the interest of preserving national
sovereignty." [ 1953] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1954).
32. "Each [nation] shall be responsible for the enforcement of the orders and
regulations adopted by the Commission under the authority of this Convention, in
the portion of its waters covered by the Convention." Sockeye Convention, supra note
6, at 1359. Each nation is also responsible for enforcement on the high seas in respect to
its own nationals, inhabitants, vessels, and boats. Id. In aid of this high seas enforcement
scheme, each nation is given authority to seize and detain violators who are subject to
the enforcement power of the other nation. Id. This scheme is in harmony with other
fisheries agreements in which care is taken to prevent enforcement procedures from
creating precedents for encroachment upon the principle of national sovereignty. See
J. ToMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 56. For an account of how the United States has discharged its enforcement obligations under the Convention, see note 58 infra.
33. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1355. The Commission has been guided
over the years by this declared purpose, but has not limited itself to responsibilities
listed in the Sockeye Convention. [1964] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN.
REP. 3 (1965). Although not specifically enumerated as one of its functions, the Commission has kept a watchful eye on the utilization of the natural resources of the Fraser
River watershed, e.g., logging, hydroelectric power, industrial development, flood con-

trol, and placer mining, and has actively reported to the Canadian government whenever such utilization would have a potentially detrimental impact on the salmon
resource. [ 1966] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-7 (1967); [ 1964]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1965); [1956] INT'L PAC. SALMON

FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 5 (1957). Without political powers over these operations,
the Commission has relied upon the cooperation of the Canadian government for the
protection of the spawning environment of the Fraser River. [ 1968] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1969). The Commission has boasted "without qualification that there is no historical precedent for the quality of planning inherent in the development and protection of the natural resources of the Fraser River basin." [ 1966]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1967).
34.

Although it has consistently denied possessing the legal powers and responsibili-

ties to deal with "political" problems, the Commission has been most vocal in airing its
views and documenting any potential adverse impact on the salmon resources. [ 1975]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP.

3 (1976) (management, industry, and

governmental problems); [1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6

(1975) (domestic allocation of U.S. share of the fishery); [1966] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1967) (utilization of other natural resources in the

412

Accommodation of Indian Treaty Rights
2.

Commission management:Practicaland biological complexities

The history of the Commission has reflected an emphasis-on scientific investigation. 35 Consequently, an understanding of the biological
nature of the Fraser River salmon is essential in order to grasp the
complexities and uncertainties which burden the Commission's regulatory program.
The annual runs of salmon to the Fraser River are not homogeneous but are composed of a number of interrelated subpopulations usually referred to as races. Each race migrates through the commercial
fishery waters at its own characteristic time and spawns consistently in
its home stream at a specific time each year. 36 The Commission's
scientific advances in identifying these separate races and the need to
treat each race as a separate management unit have complicated the
37
regulatory tasks faced by the Commisson.
Fraser River watershed); [1964]

INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3
(1965) (pollution); [1961] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (1962)
(economic plight of individual fishermen as result of their increased numbers); [1953]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1954) (economic plight of the fish-

ermen). In this fashion, the Commission has not ignored the various problems, but
rather has relegated the solutions to the respective governments pursuant to the scheme
of the Sockeye Convention. "Important as it may be to resolve these problems, it is even
more important that attention not be diverted from the objective of increasing the resource." [1975] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1976).

35.
[1962] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1963); [1955]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1956); [1949] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3, 5 (1950); [1944] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 23 (1945). See also J. TOMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 59-60. This scientific orientation has resulted in construction of artificial spawning channels, [1976]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 13-15 (1977), rehabilitation of severely depleted races of salmon, id. at 15, biological research into the delicate environmental sensitivity of the salmon, id. at 16-20, participation in efforts to protect the
environment necessary for the successful propagation of the runs, id. at 20-23, and engineering investigations to monitor and predict the effects of hydroelectric generation,
tributary diversion, river flow fluctuations, waste discharges, and gravel removal on the
sockeye and pink salmon runs, id. at 23-28. The sophistication of Fraser River salmon
management has been attained through just such scientific endeavor. [ 1965] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1966). See also [1950] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1951).

36. [1956] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 5-6 (1957). See also J.
CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 123 -24.
37. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 143-45 (1969). A perusal
of the Annual Reports of the Commission issued pursuant to the provisions of the Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357, will reveal the complexities of the Commission's
regulatory and enhancement programs. See, e.g., [1967] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-14 (1968); [1965] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN.
REP. 3-6 (1966); [1962] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 17-21
(1963). See also note 41 infra.
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Although the commission's duties were limited initially to scientific
and historical investigations, 38 it was during these years that its regulatory philosophy evolved. Early investigations determined that a
man-made obstruction to salmon migration in the Fraser River had
caused selective depletion of various races.3 9 To remedy the imbalances, the Commission, where possible, protects the endangered races
40
with closures and allows liberal harvesting of the abundant races.
This philosophy is burdened with biological complexities which belie
41
its apparent simplicity.
38. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357 (defining investigative authority);
id. at 1360 (second understanding denying regulatory authority for initial eight years of
Convention). [ 19531 INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1954).

39. See, e.g., [1941] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-5 (1942).
As a result of the blockade at Hell's Gate Canyon, an estimated one-half to two-thirds of
all sockeye salmon reaching the blockade failed to pass and died without successfully
spawning. Id. at 9. The impact on the pink salmon was even more drastic. [ 1957] INT'L

PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 21 (1958). For the story of the Hell's Gate
discovery and the solution of the problem through construction of an innovative "fishway," see [1946] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-7 (1947). It was
ultimately determined that Hell's Gate and other obstructions in the Fraser River basin,
not overfishing as formerly believed, were primarily responsible for the great decline in
the fishery in the early 20th century. [1966] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N
ANN. REP. 3 (1967); [ 19551 INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1956);
[1948] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-4 (1949). See also note 14
supra.
40.
[1948] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 5 (1949). See also J.
CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 145-46.

41. Although simple in theory, the philosophy of allowing self-rehabilitation of the
endangered races is often not compatible with other conservation goals. For example,
there is an optimum level of escapement for each race, depending upon such factors as
the capacity of the spawning grounds and the abundance of plankton which the sockeye
fry depend upon in their period of fresh-water rearing in the large lakes of the Fraser
River watershed. [1965] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1966);
[1955] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 9-11 (1956). The optimum
levels of escapement also vary from year to year to account for natural variations in run
size within a quadrennial cycle. [1965] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN.
REP. 3 (1966). The Commission is conscious of the dangers of overescapement to its
program. [1969] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 19 (1970); [1954]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 28 (1955); [ 1953] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 19 (1954). See also J. ToMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 24445. Since several races may migrate through the commercial fishery at the same time, it
is obviously difficult to regulate abundant races and endangered races which migrate together. [1966] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 18 (1967). Added to
this problem is a management objective of obtaining racial escapement from the peak of
a run, since these fish tend to be most suitable for propagation. [1955] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 8 (1956);

[ 1953] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES

COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1954).

The Commission is also plagued with management uncertainties. Its annual regulations are dependent upon predicting the size of the returning runs, and although its scientific prediction methods are quite detailed, they lack certainty. [1967] INT'L PAC.
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The Commission is further burdened by the realities of the salmon
42
fishing industry. The immense harvesting capability of the large and
efficient commercial fleet competing for the salmon which move
through the fishery at considerable speed necessitates daily evalua43
tions and regulatory adjustments throughout the season. Without
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-14 (1968). The annual regulations are also
based upon predicting gear efficiencies for the coming season, which in turn depends

upon predicting the average size of the fish. [1966] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (1967). The Commission also must estimate the size of the actual
runs and escapements. [ 1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 19, 24
(1978); [ 1962] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 21 (1963). Such pre-

dictions and estimates are inherently uncertain.
The provisions of the Convention also serve to complicate the Commission's task further. Article VII requires the Commission to "regulate the fishery with a view to allowing, as nearly as may be practicable, an equal portion of the fish that may be harvested
to be taken by the fishermen of each [country] ." Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at
1358-59. This allocative requirement complicates management and "dooms the
Commission to a series of second-best solutions, year by year, since only the most miraculous of coincidences could assure that closures to balance the catch would also result
in optimum escapement." J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 146. See
[1954] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 28 (1955).
An additional complication is introduced by the variability of migration routes because when an unexpectedly large proportion of the Fraser runs migrates down the east
side of Vancouver Island from the north, and thus can be taken in areas outside the regulatory authority of the treaty, the Commission is forced to make adjustments within its
jurisdiction, the Convention waters. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10,
at 144-45.
To complicate matters further, the addition of pink salmon to the Commission's
jurisdiction as a result of the Pink Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, has resulted in an

overlap between the late-running sockeye races and the pink salmon runs. [1959] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP: 13 (1960).

This list of biological complexities and management uncertainties is far from exhaustive. The extremely complex scientific management of the Fraser River fishery is detailed further in the annual reports issued by the Commission. The annual reports are
required by the Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1357.
42. [1958] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 13 (1959); [1946]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 14 (1947). "Further evidence of the
alarming capability of the current Convention waters fishery was observed in 1965

when on July 28 and 29, the United States catch of sockeye represented 42.4 percent of
the total season's catch." [1965] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16

(1966).
43. "The quantity and composition of the escapement becomes more
control as the intensity and effectiveness of the fishery increases and longer
sons are provided to permit escapement." [1955] INT'L PAC. SALMON
COMM'N ANN. REP. 12 (1956). The fishery has become overdeveloped to
where management of the fishery has become extremely difficult and liable

difficult to
closed seaFISHERIES
the "point
to possible

errors of importance." [1961] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16
(1962. See also [1956] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 22 (1957).

"With a rapidly increasing number of fishermen each year the need for flexible regulation and periodic adjustment in fishing time increases in importance. Inflexible control
endangers seasonal division between the two countries and tends to upset the proper
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proper regulatory adjustments, nearly all returning fish from a particular race could be harvested in a short period. 44 Consequently,
prompt and accurate data acquisition and evaluation are of critical
importance to effective regulation. 45
In accounting for this matrix of complexities in its regulations, the
Commission is also faced with pressure from each competing type of
gear (e.g., gill nets, reef nets, purse seines, and trollers) for a greater
share of the fishery. Although the Commission has no jurisdiction
over the numbers or types of gear that may be operated in Convention
waters, 46 its regulations allocate certain fishing gear to certain areas at

balance between the catch and escapement of individual races." [1949] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 13 (1950). See also [1962] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 17 (1963). When the Commission regulates in recognition
of the overdeveloped fishery, labor strikes within the fishing industry seriously hamper
Commission efforts to obtain proper escapements and division of catch. [ 1975] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 14 (1976); [ 1963] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1964); [ 1959] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN.

REP. 10-11 (1960). "An absolute necessity for [obtaining proper escapement and division of catch] is a relatively stable fishery that is reasonably controlled as to size, efficiency and fishing area." [1955] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 30
(1956). See also [1961] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (1962).

Since the problem of accommodating Indian treaty rights in this international fishery is
directly related to the heavy restrictions on fishing times, see note 60 and accompanying
text infra, which are necessitated by the overdeveloped nature of the commercial fishery, a reduction in the fleet size would be a major step toward both an improved environment for scientific regulation and accommodation of Indian treaty rights. See Part
V-B supra.
44. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 146. While a fleet of some
900 vessels is capable of harvesting nearly all of a particular race, id., the present commercial fleet in U.S. Convention waters alone far exceeds 900 vessels. See note 60 infra.
45. As noted by the Commission:
Prompt compilation of the daily catches indicates any deviation from the preseason calculationsof the expected size of the run, the related catch by gear and by
area, and the expected efficiency of the fishermen of the two countries, and guides
the preparationof any necessary modifications of the fishing regulations.
[1949] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 28 (1950) (emphasis in original). Besides being essential for formulation of regulations to protect and rehabilitate
the salmon runs, [ 1944] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1945), the
acquisition and evaluation of statistics is necessary to solve the problem of equal division of catch between the two countries. Id. at 5 1-52. To augment its acquisition of data
during the season, the Commission conducts its own test fishery. [1962] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 21 (1963). The test fishery is especially important
during periods when the commercial fishery is closed, id., because the flow of catch data
from the commercial fishery is not then available. See also [1960] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 12- 13 (1961).
46. Jurisdiction over these matters rests with the respective national or state or provincial governments as matters of domestic law. United States v. Washington, Civ. No.
9213, slip op. at 103 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 1975) (Record, vol. 31).
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particular times. 47 Through this regulatory segregation of gear-types,
for an equitable distributhe Commission has attempted to provide
48
gear-types.
the
among
tion of the harvest
It is apparent that the intricacies inherent in the fishery management provide the Commission with a difficult task requiring scientific
solution. The importance of United States-Canadian cooperation in
keeping this task as manageable as possible is self-evident.
3.

The Sockeye Convention today: Forty years of cooperative
success threatened

The joint management scheme of the Sockeye Convention has been
highly effective and the resulting achievements of the Commission are
unprecedented in the field of fishery management. 49 Although the
Commission deserves much of the credit for its rational, scientific approach to the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the Fraser
River fishery, its successes could not have been realized without the
cooperation of the two national governments. 50
47. This regulation by gear-type is not the result of any such grant of power, but the
product of requests from the commercial fishing industry around 1957. Hearing Transcript at 95-96 (July 11, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D.
Wash. 1975). It should be noted that although the governments never granted the Commission this power, they have consistently approved such regulations since 1957. See,
e.g., [1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 4-7 (1977); [1958] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7-10 (1959).

48. "Equitable regulation of all aspects of the harvest in Convention Waters is desirable to ensure that all users of the resource participate in conservation measures."
[1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 (1975). See [1953] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1954). "As. . . the economic competition increases between fishermen and between fishing areas within a national section,
national action by the Governments concerned or national recommendations for action
may be required to control the changes in the national interest." Id. It seems quite likely
that such action would go a long way toward improving the quality of the Commission's
scientific management and accommodating American Indian treaty rights. See note 43
supra;Part V-B infra.

49. See J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10,
ment of two million dollars for construction of fishways after
Gate and other impediments to the upstream migration of the
with sound scientific regulation to protect the endangered races
in an increase in annual value of $9,298,000 to fishermen and

at 142-43. The investthe discovery of Hell's
salmon, in conjunction
of salmon, has resulted
$17,737,000 wholesale,

based on 1968 dollars. [1968] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6

(1969). The Commission's research and experimentation has indicated that a further investment of $14 million dollars for a recommended development program would result
in future benefits in excess of $14 million dollars annually. [ 1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 (1975).
50. The Commission's programs would be ineffective if either nation refused to approve or enforce the regulations. They depend upon funding from the two nations as
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It necessarily follows that future success in preserving and enhancing the fishery depends upon continued cooperation between the two
national governments and the Commission. This cooperation has
been threatened in the past few years by disagreement over accommodation of American Indian treaty rights within the Commission's regulatory framework. The next section of this comment documents the
various United States accommodation efforts, the resistance encountered, and the consequent strain on both the resource and the essential
spirit of cooperation.
III.

U.S. EFFORTS TO ACCOMMODATE THE INDIAN
TREATY RIGHTS WITHIN THE REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK OF THE COMMISSION

A portion of the Fraser River salmon runs pass through traditional
Indian treaty fishing grounds enroute to the spawning grounds of the
Fraser River. 5 1 A literal application of Judge Boldt's decision 5 2 would
entitle certain Indians with rights under the Stevens treaties 53 to the
opportunity to catch fifty percent of the U.S. harvest of this portion.
By the terms of the Sockeye Convention, the U.S. harvest is fifty percent of the total allowable Fraser River harvest. 54 The relationship
well. See notes 31 & 32 supra. Without the cooperation of the Canadian government,
which is directly concerned with the development of the Fraser River watershed, the success of the Commission would be impossible. [1968] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1969). Since the Commission's task is already greatly burdened
by the difficulties inherent in the management of this complex fishery, it is essential that
the United States and Canada avoid disagreements which would further complicate its
task. See also J. ToMASEVICH, supra note I, at 57, 61.
51. Judge Boldt's decision provides only for treaty rights exercisable over fish that
the treaty Indians could trace to their "usual and accustomed fishing places." See
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 344. To date eight tribes have established
that they have historical fishing sites within the migratory path of the Fraser River
salmon: Makah Tribe, Lower Elwha Band Clallam Tribe, Port Gamble Band Clallam
Tribe, Suquamish Tribe, Lummi Tribe, Nooksack Tribe, Swinomish Indian Tribal
Community, and Tulalip Tribe. 42 Fed. Reg. 31, 450-51 (1977). For the sake of convenience, these tribes will be referred to as treaty Indian fishermen.
52. See note 3 supra.
53. These treaties are discussed in note 5 supra.
54. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1358-59, quoted in note 30 supra. In reality, the United States does not receive 50% of the Fraser River pink and sockeye harvest because a significant number of sockeye follow a migratory path along the eastern
side of Vancouver Island which is outside Convention waters and thus not subject to the
Convention requirements. J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 144-45.
In 1977 this non-Convention Canadian catch amounted to approximately 763,000 sockeye alone. [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (1978).
Furthermore, Canadian Indians harvested an additional 246,528 sockeye directly from
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between the Stevens treaties and the Sockeye Convention was judicially defined in 1974 when Judge Boldt's opinion stated that "[t] he
1937 convention does not explicitly or implicitly modify the Stevens'
treaties. However...treaty right tribes fishing in waters under the jurisdiction of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission
must comply with regulations of the Commission. '5 5 Therefore,
within the constraints of the Commission regulations, the treaty Indians would be entitled to the opportunity to catch half of the American
harvest of Fraser River salmon migrating through their traditional
56
fishing sites.

the Fraser River, which is also outside the authority of the Sockeye Convention. Id. at
20. Thus, over one million sockeye were taken by Canadians over and above their 50%
Convention share. In comparison, the total treaty Indian catch of both sockeye and pink
salmon for 1977, which counted as part of the United States' 50% Convention share,
was less than 474,000. Compare id. with National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Preliminary Summary of the 1977 Sockeye and Pink Salmon Commercial Fisheries in U.S., Convention Waters, table 6 (on file with Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as 1977 Preliminary Summary]. Thus, Canada received over 62% of
the harvest reported by the Commission. See generally [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 15-16 (1978). This does not include catches of salmon that
may have occurred in Alaskan, coastal Canadian, and international waters.
55. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 411. This was Judge Boldt's answer to a motion to reconsider the role of the Sockeye Convention vis-a-vis the Indian
treaty rights. He had earlier stated:
A considerable number of fish taken within the territorial waters of Washington
are under the regulatory authority of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries
Commission, an international body established by treaty between the United States
and Canada. While the defendants [State of Washington] cannot determine or
control the activities of that Commission, the Washington Department of Fisheries
does have some input into development of the harvest program which is prescribed
or permitted by that Commission, particularly as it pertains to harvest within
Washington.. . . Consequently, while it must be recognized that these large harvests by non-treaty fishermen cannot be regulated with any certainty or precision
by the state defendants, it is incumbent upon such defendants to take all appropriate steps within their actual abilities to assure as nearly as possible an equal sharing
of the opportunity for treaty and non-treaty fishermen to harvest every species of
fish to which the treaty tribes had access at their usual and accustomed fishing
places at treaty times.
Id. at 344.
56. It is incorrect to conclude that the treaty Indians are entitled to the opportunity
to harvest 50% of the total U.S. Convention catch because not all of the salmon that are
harvested in U.S. Convention waters migrate through traditional treaty Indian fishing
sites. See Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Injunctive Relief at 2-3, Record, vol. 31, doe. no. 1171 (filed July 14, 1975), United States v.
Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975). For example, assuming that one million
harvestable fish enter the Strait of Juan de Fuca, of which only 100,000 pass through traditional treaty Indian sites, literal application of Judge Boldt's decision would dictate
that the treaty Indians are entitled to the opportunity to harvest 50,000 fish, not 500,000.
384 F. Supp. at 343. The federal court, however, has at times ignored this distinction in
its orders and held that treaty Indian fishermen be given "an opportunity to take up to

419

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:403, 1979

The 1974 Commission regulations made no provision for allocating this opportunity to treaty Indian fishermen. 57 After several Indian
tribes indicated an intention to fish in violation of these regulations,
the Washington State Department of Fisheries (Fisheries), at that time
responsible for U.S. enforcement of the Commission regulations, 5 8
obtained an order from Judge Boldt permitting Fisheries to enforce
50% of the U.S. [Convention] share of the harvestable fish." See, e.g., United States v.
Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 9 (W.D. Wash. July 16. 1975) (findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and decree regarding 1975 Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon
harvest, Record, vol. 3 1, doc. no. 1176). For further discussion of what opportunity is
guaranteed by Indian treaty rights, see note 71 infra.
57.

[1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 8-12 (1975). Treaty

Indians are identified in note 51 supra.
58. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 776d(a) (1976), the President designated the Fish and
Wildlife Service of the Department of Interior as the enforcement agency. Exec. Order
No. 9892, 12 Fed. Reg. 6345 (1947). This designation was transferred to the National
Marine Fisheries Service, a subagency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the Department of Commerce, by Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970,
35 Fed. Reg. 15,627, 84 Stat. 2090 (1970). The designated enforcement agency is empowered to authorize officers and employees of the State of Washington to act as federal
law enforcement officers. 16 U.S.C. § 776d(b) (1976). Although no such formal authorization ever occurred, enforcement of the Convention was handled by officers of the
Washington State Department of Fisheries from 1947 through 1976. See United States
v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 392. Contrary to the provisions of the federal law authorizing delegation of enforcement to state officers, 16 U.S.C. § 776d(b) (1976), these
state officers have acted as state, not federal, officers and have enforced state law which
adopted the Commission regulations. WASH. REv. CODE § 75.40.060 (1976). See also
note 84 infra. This enforcement scheme was changed for the 1977 and 1978 seasons. Report of Annual Meeting of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission in
Vancouver, B.C., at 4 (Dec. 9, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review). Enforcement is now handled by the designated federal agency, the National Marine Fisheries
Service, and the United States Coast Guard. Id.; United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d
1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 1978). This change in enforcement responsibility was prompted by
the breakdown in state law enforcement as evidenced by the issuance of very few citations to violators, the refusal of state prosecutors to prosecute those issued, and the series of Washington Supreme Court decisions attempting to strip state agencies and officials of their power to comply with the district court's orders. Puget Sound Gillnetters
Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 1978).
This narrowing of the role of the State of Washington in the management of its
fisheries is consistent with a narrowing of the state's role in non-Convention waters of
the state as well. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 19-20 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 31, 1977) (memorandum order removing the Indian treaty allocation from
the state's jurisdiction, leaving the state with limited control over only the non-Indian
share of the catch, Record, vol. 68, doc. no. 3265E); United States v. Washington, Civ.
No. 9213, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 1977) (memorandum order removing the
state's jurisdiction over appropriate year and season openings for the non-treaty allocation as well, Record, vol. 73, doc. no. 3545). The Ninth Circuit has stated that "[t] he
state's extraordinary machinations in resisting the decree have forced the district court
to take over a large share of the management of the state's fishery in order to enforce its
decrees." Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123,
1126 (9th Cir. 1978).
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Commission regulations against such tribes. 59 Consequently, the relatively small and less efficient treaty Indian commercial fishing fleet
was forced to fish side by side with the large, efficient non-Indian
60
commercial armada to obtain their treaty share.
A.

The 1975 Season: InternationalDisagreementand Unilateral
Action by the United States

61
Because the United States is the trustee of the Indian treaty rights
and is also directly involved in enacting Commission regulations,6 2 efforts were made to remedy the resultant large imbalance between the
treaty Indian and the all-citizen harvest. 63 The United States sought
1975 Commission regulations that allowed the small treaty Indian
fleet to fish during periods when the fishery was closed to the other
American fishermen. This would have created a special treaty Indian
fishery in U.S. Convention waters.
The U.S. Department of State formally instructed the U.S. Commissioners to propose that the 1975 Commission regulations include
language "sufficiently flexible to ensure that domestic decisions on the
Indian fishery can be implemented, within the salmon treaty constraints of conservation and the 50/50 split of the-treaty catch between

59.

United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. July

18, 1974) (enforcement order, Record, vol. 18, doc. no. 655). The order stated:
[R] egulations adopted by the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission
shall be presumed to be controlling with respect to fishing by any treaty tribe or its
members and the Defendants [State of Washington] may enforce the provisions of
said regulations as incorporated in the regulations of the Defendants against members of such tribes.
Id.
60. In 1974, fishing was generally limited to two days per week. [1974] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 8-12 (1975). These two days were broken into

shorter overlapping periods according to gear-type (purse seines, gill nets, reef nets,
trollers), further limiting the treaty Indian opportunity to fish. Id. See also note 80 infra.

The size of the treaty Indian fishing fleet has doubled from 108 vessels in 1975 to 215 in
1977. The size of the all-citizen fleet has decreased slightly from 1,466 units in 1974 to
1,327 units in 1977. Compare United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 4
(W.D. Wash. July 16, 1975) (findings of fact, Record, vol. 3 1, doc. no. 1176) with 1977

Preliminary Summary, supra note 54, table 7. The treaty Indian fleet managed only
1.4% of the total U.S. Convention waters harvest for 1974. United States v. Washing-

ton, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 1975) (findings of fact, Record,
vol. 31,
61.
62.
63.

doc. no. 1176).
See sources cited in note 8 supra.
See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
The all-citizen fishery includes all citizens, whether Indian or non-Indian, other

than treaty Indian fishermen fishing at "usual and accustomed fishing places" within the
migratory path of Fraser River salmon. See note 51 supra (treaty Indians identified).
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Canada and the [United States]."64 Pursuant to these instructions,
the U.S. Commissioners offered a proposal that would permit the
United States to make a domestic allocation of its share of the catch in
Convention waters to treaty Indian fishermen. This proposal, however, was rejected by the Canadian Commissioners. 65 The Canadian
64. Letter from William L. Sullivan, Jr. to Donald R. Johnson (Oct. 1, 1974) (on
file with Washington Lxw Review):
Further, the Government has a responsibility to protect Indian treaty rights. The
decision in U.S. v. Washington should thus be implemented to the extent possible
by affirmative action by U.S. officials in matters within their purview, including
the I.P.S.F.C. Commissioners.
In the case of I.P.S.F.C., the regulations adopted should provide, to the extent
possible, for affirmative action to secure the Indian fishing rights, but in any event
should not serve as an impediment to domestic action to secure those rights ...
In conveying these instructions, I wish to add the following for the guidance of
the U.S. Commissioners. The Department of State does not consider that either the
Indian treaties, or Judge Boldt's decision in U.S. v. Washington, is inconsistent
with our legal obligations under the salmon treaty, and we intend to continue our
full support of the I.P.S.F.C.
Id. See Letter from William L. Sullivan, Jr., to Donald W. Moos (Apr. I1,1975), Record, vol. 29, doe. no. 1122, at 14-15 (filed June 10, 1975), United States v. Washington,
Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
65.

[1975] INT'L PAC. SALMON FiSHERIES COMM'N ANN.

REP. 4 (1976). No Com-

mission action is effective without the vote of at least two of the three Commissioners
from each country. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1358. Therefore, one country
can always block action proposed by the other country, as in this particular instance.
This Canadian rejection was expected. Negotiations prior to the season had indicated
that the Canadian government preferred that the 1975 fishing season begin under Commission regulations. It felt that the United States could specify under domestic
legislation that certain of the days open under the Commission regulations be restricted
to fishing by treaty Indian fishermen only. If the effort by the treaty Indians was insufficient to permit the total U.S. Convention fishery to reach the division of catch goals set
by the Commission, then, following its normal practice under such circumstances, the
Commission could have issued emergency orders allowing an increased number of days
open to the U.S. fisheries to assure that the targets would be reached. Letter from M.P.
Shepard to William L. Sullivan, Jr., (Jan. 10, 1975), Record, vol. 29, doc. no. 1122, at
12-13 (filed June 10, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash.
1975).
In practical effect, the Canadian proposal would produce the same results as the
United States' separate regulatory scheme, see note 112 infra, which gave treaty Indians
an "extra day" of fishing each week during the 1977 and 1978 seasons. For 1977, see 42
Fed. Reg. 3 1,450-53 (1977), revoked 42 Fed. Reg. 58,744 (1977) (regulations for treaty
Indians); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,841-43 (1977) (regulations for all-citizens). For 1978, see 43
Fed. Reg. 27,187 (1978) (to be codified in 25 C.F.R. §§ 251.11-.21) (regulations for
treaty Indians); 43 Fed. Reg. 26,737 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. §§ 371.1-.9)
(regulations for all-citizens). The Canadians proposed that U.S. domestic measures preclude fishing by anyone but treaty Indians on one Commission-allowed day each week.
They anticipated that, because fishing on that day would be of low intensity, Commission emergency orders later in the season would increase fishing time to make up for the
resulting loss of expected harvest. The United States' separate regulatory scheme allowed the full-intensity fishery on Commission-allowed days plus an "extra day" each
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reluctance to specifically recognize the treaty rights of U.S. treaty Indians allegedly stems from fear that if they support special rules for
them, they will have "a burden placed upon themselves to give greater
recognition to their own Indians." 66 Consequently, the Commission
regulations adopted for 1975 by the respective national governments
67
contained no provisions for a special treaty Indian fishery.
Prior to the opening of the 1975 season, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed Judge Boldt's decision regarding the relationship
between the Stevens treaties and the Sockeye Convention 68 and indicated that the treaty Indians' remedy was an equitable adjustment to
the treaty Indians' permitted catch in non-Convention waters.6 9 This
solution compensated the Indian treaty rights without interfering with
the Commission, but it was an impractical solution to the treaty Indians who would be forced to obtain their equitable adjustment from
week for treaty Indians, thus resulting in a greater harvest than anticipated by the Commission regulations and forcing the Commission to decrease fishing time later in the
season. The Canadian proposal and the U.S. scheme would have the same net effect of
providing treaty Indians with an "extra day" of fishing each week.
66. Oral Deposition of Thor C. Tollefson, United States Commissioner, at 29 (filed
June 11, 1974), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1974). Canadian Indians are not without fishing rights in the Fraser River salmon fisheries. They are
allowed a subsistence fishery in their historically established fishing locations. [1953]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 19 (1954). Permits are required and
the subsistence fishery is controlled by Fisheries Inspectors of the Canadian Department
of Fisheries Id. at 18. See also note 192 infra.
67. See [1975] INT'L PAC. SALMON FiSHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6-10 (1976); Letter from William L. Sullivan, Jr., to William R. Hourston (Apr. 11, 1975) (transmitting
United States approval). On the same day, the approved regulations were transmitted to
the State of Washington for implementation. Letter from William L. Sullivan, Jr., to
Donald W. Moos (Apr. 11, 1975), Record, vol. 29, doc. no. 1122, at 14-15 (filed June
10, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975). Consistent
with its previous instructions to the United States Commissioners, the Department of
State instructed "that the State will regulate in a manner consistent with Indian treaty
rights." Id. See note 64 supra.
68. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
69. United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 689-90 (9th Cir. 1975). The court
explained:
We reject the State's contention that the Convention and Act have "preempted" Indian treaty rights to harvest Fraser River salmon .... Congress sufficiently indicated its intent that all persons, including Indians, be subject to Commission regulations, but, in the absence of an explicit expression of intent to terminate treaty
rights, losses to other citizens sustained through compliance with those regulations
should be redressed as above stated by adding to the treaty Indians' permitted catch
in areas under state jurisdiction.
Id. This court placed great reliance on a Supreme Court decision exhibiting extreme reluctance to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights in the absence of explicit abrogative language. Id. (relying on Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404
(1968)).
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non-Convention waters.70 Petitioning the federal district court, the
treaty Indians sought to secure their treaty right to fish unregulated in
Convention waters, except for non-discriminatory regulations necessary for conservation. 7 1 The court issued a preliminary injunction
against Fisheries, enjoining it from allowing any non-Indian fishing in

70. There are several impracticalities associated with such a solution. Any such
equitable adjustment fishery "would result in a duplicitous fishing opportunity for
[treaty Indians], or require them to fish later in a region which is not their usual and accustomed fishing area." Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
State, Civ. No. C77-471M, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. July 8, 1977) (findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and order denying motion for preliminary injunction, Record, vol.
2, doc. no. 25), aff'd, 584 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1978). Since the Fraser River fisheries are
by far the most productive of all the area's fisheries, see sources cited in note 10 supra, it
would be impractical to have such a large equitable adjustment come from non-Convention salmon runs that have very limited numbers of harvestable fish. It would require a total closure of non-Indian fishing in non-Convention waters. Memorandum
from Alvin J. Ziontz, attorney, to United States v. Washington case file (Aug. 23, 1976)
(on file with Washington Law Review). See also note 105 infra.
71. In view of Fisheries' refusal to provide by regulation for extra treaty Indian
fishing time, the United States requested preliminary and permanent injunctions. Motion for Injunction, Record, vol. 29, doc. no. 1122 (filed June 10, 1975), United States v.
Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975). It was claimed that the imbalance between the relative fleet sizes of the treaty Indian and the all-citizen fisheries and the lack
of sophisticated treaty Indian gear required that the treaty Indians be given more fishing
time in which to harvest their treaty share. Id. at 7.
The Indians' treaty fishing rights have been held by the United States Supreme Court
to be federally secured rights that are not subject to state regulation without a showing
that such regulations are nondiscriminatory and necessary for conservation. Puyallup
Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392, 398 (1968). See also Department of
Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973).
In quantifying these rights to guarantee treaty Indians the opportunity to catch 50%
of the harvestable fish passing through treaty fishing sites, Judge Boldt's decision leaves
the word "opportunity" open to construction. In the context of the Fraser River salmon
fishery, there are two plausible constructions: (1) the right to have fishing gear in the water exposed to 50% of the salmon migrating through treaty Indian sites which are harvestable by the United States under Commission regulations, or (2) the right to fish unregulated until the 50% share is obtained. In considering these and other possible
constructions, one should be aware that there are conceptual difficulties in applying
Judge Boldt's decision to open-water treaty Indian participation in an international
fishery. First, since the treaty Indian sites do not cover the entire route which migrating
salmon cross, the treaty Indians are entitled to less than 50% of the total harvestable
Fraser River salmon allocated to the United States. See note 56 supra. This is not the
case with river fishing when a river's entire returning run is destined for the treaty fishing sites. Second, because harvesting efficiency is significantly lower in open-water fishing than in gillnetting in rivers, it is more difficult to make a meaningful comparison
between actual harvest and the opportunity to harvest. See generally note 97 infra.
Thus, application of Judge Boldt's decision to the Fraser River salmon fishery is conceptually even more complex than it has proved to be as applied to other fisheries terminating in Washington rivers.

424

Accommodation of Indian Treaty Rights
U.S. Convention waters until it had provided by regulation for a spe72
cial treaty Indian fishery.
Fisheries adopted the position "that to change the regulations once
adopted by the [Commission] and approved by the two nations
would require action by the [Commission] ."3 Consequently, Fisheries identified four alternative special treaty Indian fishery regulations and requested the Commission to grant authority to adopt one
of them.7 4 The court stayed its injunction to allow the fishery to commence under existing Commission regulations and to give the
Commission time in which to consider and respond to Fisheries' re75
quest.
After the Commission responded negatively,7 6 the court further
72. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Wash. June
26, 1975) (Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1148). The order gave the Director of Fisheries until
July 1, 1975, to file the court-ordered regulations. Id. at 2.
73. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay at 6 (filed Aug. 15, 1975), United
States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978).
74. Letter from Donald W. Moos to William R. Hourston (June 27, 1975), in Defendant's Response to Preliminary Injunction, Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1163, attachment no. 1, at 1-2 (filed July 10, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213
(W.D. Wash. 1975).
75. Upon the state's motion, without objection from the United States, the court
modified its preliminary injunction to allow the Director of Fisheries until July 10,
1975, to submit appropriate regulations in conformance with the preliminary injunction. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. June 30, 1975) (order,
Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1151). Thus, the fishery commenced on July 6, 1975, under the
Commission regulations for 1975. On July 10, 1975, the Director of Fisheries suspended the state regulations which had adopted the Commission regulations. Defendant's Response to Preliminary Injunction (Fisheries Order No. 1218), Record, vol. 3 1,
doec. no. 1163, attachment no. 4 (filed July 10, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ.
No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
76. Letter from William R. Hourston to Donald W. Moos (July 8, 1975), in Defendant's Response to Preliminary Injunction, Record, vol. 31, doec. no. 1163, attachment
no. 3 (filed July 10, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash.
1975). The Commission responded that the subject of division of the U.S. catch between
Indians and non-Indians "was not a proper concern for the International Pacific
Salmon Fisheries Commission, whose areas of responsibility are defined by the Sockeye
Salmon Convention." Id. Accord, [1975] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN.
REP. 4 (1976); [1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1975); Re-

port of Annual Meeting of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission in
Vancouver, B.C., at 3 (Dec. 9, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review).
Subsequently, Fisheries Director Donald W. Moos contacted the U.S. Department of
State, outlining four alternative proposals with respect to its fisheries under the jurisdiction of the Commission and requesting guidance as to whether any or all of these alternatives would be consistent with U.S. Sockeye Convention obligations. The response
from William L. Sullivan, Jr., after consultation with the Canadian government, was
that the first alternative (extra days for treaty Indian fishermen) would be objectionable
to the State Department; the second alternative (restricting non-Indian fishing more
than the Commission regulations would otherwise require) would be acceptable; the
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suspended its preliminary injunction until midnight, July 16, 1975,
77
thereby allowing another week of the Commission-regulated fishery.
On July 16, the court issued a permanent injunction ordering Fish78
eries to establish by regulation two special treaty Indian fisheries,
but this injunction was stayed that same day " [p] ending the conclusion of discussions between representatives of the United States and
Canada" scheduled for later that week.79 The diplomatic meeting
failed to achieve agreement permitting implementation of the two special treaty Indian fisheries. 80 Consequently, the United States initiated
steps to suspend its approval of that part of the 1975 Commission regulations which allocated fishing time to specific types of gear in U.S.
8
Convention waters. 1

third alternative (allowing all treaty Indians to fish with any gear whenever the Commission allowed fishing by any U.S. fishermen) was not objectionable in principle, but
the State Department was opposed to it given existing Commission regulations; and the
State Department had no legal objection to the fourth alternative (closing down the
United States' non-Indian fishery) although it might seem to violate the spirit of the
Convention. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 6-8 (W.D. Wash.
July 16, 1975) (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree).
77. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. July 14, 1975) (further
stay of June 26, 1975, preliminary injunction, Record, vol. 3 1,doc. no. 1169). This stay
was granted to allow the court time to consider the substance of the full hearing conducted this day before issuing or denying a permanent injunction.
78. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Wash. July
16, 1975) (injunction regarding 1975 Fraser River sockeye and pink salmon harvest,
Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1177). The two special treaty Indian fisheries were as follows:
(I) a five-day-per-week fishery in the Strait of Juan de Fuca (exceeding by several days
per week the Commission regulations, [1975] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N
ANN. REP. 8-9 (1976)); and (2) a fishery allowing treaty Indians to fish, regardless of
gear-type, whenever the United States Convention waters were open for any type of
gear. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. July 16.
1975). The five-day-per-week fishery in the Strait of Juan de Fuca was later deleted in
an amendment of this injunction. See note 85 infra. Judge Boldt had considered the Canadian proposal, supra note 65, but chose the action noted above upon his finding that it
"'would cause the least disruption to the commission's management scheme and to the
non-Indian fishery." United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 7 (W.D.
Wash. July 16, 1975) (findings of fact, Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1176).
79. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 1975) (minute order staying permanent injunction of same day, Record, vol. 3 1,doc. no. 1172).
80. The meeting and its results are discussed in the affidavit of William L. Sullivan.
Jr., the official who headed the U.S. delegation. Affidavit of William L. Sullivan, Jr..
Record, vol. 3 1, doc. no. 1187 (filed July 23, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ.
No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975). Upon considering the results of the meeting, Judge Boldt
continued his stay of the July 16 injunction. United States v. Washington, Civ. No.
9213, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Wash. July 22, 1975) (minute order further staying July 16
injunction, Record, vol. 3 1, doc. no. 1186 ).
81. It should be noted that the limited U.S. withdrawal of its previous approval of
the 1975 Commission regulations, Letter from T.A. Clingan, U.S. State Department, to
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission (July 19, 1975), in Memorandum
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In compliance with the stayed federal court order, Fisheries issued
an order allowing the two special treaty Indian fisheries, 82 but this
prompted protest from both the Commission 83 and from representatives of the all-citizen commercial fishery. The latter brought suit and
the Superior Court of the State of Washington issued a preliminary injunction ordering Fisheries to suspend its special treaty Indian fisheries regulations. 8 4 The federal district court subsequently modified
its permanent injunction and vacated the earlier stay, making the
modified injunction immediately effective. 85 Pursuant to this modiSupporting Court's Jurisdiction, Record, vol. 32, doc. no. 1239 (filed Aug. 6, 1975),
United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975), was not contrary to the
admitted authority of the Commission: "The Commission has no jurisdiction over the
numbers or types of gear that may be operated in Convention Waters. Jurisdiction over
these matters rests with the respective national or state or provincial governments as
matters of domestic law." United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 4
(W.D. Wash. July 16, 1975) (finding of fact no. 273, Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1176).
Commission regulations allocate certain fishing gear to certain areas at particular times
as a result of requests from the commercial fishing industry in order to avoid conflicts,
and not as a result of any such grant of power. See note 47 supra.
82. Fisheries Order No. 1229 (July 21, 1975), Record, vol. 31, doc. no. 1199, attachment A (filed July 25, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D.
Wash. 1975).
83. The Commission sent a letter to the Washington State Director of Fisheries protesting Order No. 1229 for not complying with the existing Commission regulations,
and urging that appropriate steps be taken immediately to implement the Commission
regulations as originally approved. Letter from William R. Hourston to Donald W.
Moos (July 22, 1975) (on file with Washington Law Review). The Commission also sent
a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State protesting the action of the Department of State in
rescinding its approval of part of the Commission regulations and urging support for the
Commission regulations as originally approved. Letter from William R. Hourston to
Dr. Henry Kissinger (July 25, 1975) (on file with Washington Law Review).
84. Upon motion of the Purse Seine Vessel Owners Association, the Superior Court
of the State of Washington for Thurston County issued a preliminary injunction ordering the Director of Fisheries to suspend the regulations authorizing the special Indian
fisheries. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, No. 52881 (Wash. Super. Ct.,
.Thurston County, July 23, 1975) (order granting preliminary injunction). The basis of
this injunction was that any Fisheries order that did not adopt verbatim the Commission
regulations was beyond the authority granted the Director by R.C.W. § 75.40.060 which
authorizes him to "adopt and to enforce the provisions of the convention between the
United States and the Dominion of Canada... and the regulations of the commission
promulgated under authority of said convention." WASH. REV. CODE §75.40.060 (1976).
The state court replaced this preliminary injunction with a permanent injunction after a
hearing on the merits. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, No. 52881 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County, Sept. 19, 1975) (permanent injunction replacing preliminary
injunction of July 23, 1975, as amended on Aug. 1, 1975). This lower court decision was
affirmed by the Washington State Supreme Court. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v.
Moos, 88 Wn. 2d 799, 567 P.2d 205 (1977).
85. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 1975) (modification of injunction and dissolution of stay, Record, vol. 32, doc. no. 1211). This
modification deleted the special five-day-per-week Indian fishery in the Strait of Juan
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fled injunction, Fisheries issued another order 86 which the Washington court ordered suspended the next day. 87 Faced with conflicting injunctions from the state and federal courts, Fisheries suspended
entirely the state regulations which had adopted the Commission regulations and in this way attempted to avoid contempt of either
court. 88 The federal court defeated this scheme by issuing an injunction ordering Fisheries to repromulgate the suspended regulations and
by enjoining further proceedings in the state courts. 89 Fisheries therede Fuca which was clearly in violation of the Commission regulations and hence the
Sockeye Convention. Id. This court action was apparently pursuant to State Department advice opposing such a fishery and requesting that it be deleted. Affidavit of William L. Sullivan, Jr., Record, vol. 32, doc. no. 1239 (filed Aug. 6, 1975), United States
v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975); see Affidavit of William L. Sullivan.
Jr., Record. vol. 31, doc. no. 1187, at 3 (filed July 23, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1975). See also United States v. Washington, Civ. No.
9213, slip op. at 6-7 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 1975) (Department of State rejected proposal
of Director of Fisheries that treaty Indians be given extra days).
Although it objected to giving treaty Indians extra time not authorized by the
Commission regulations, the State Department fully supported the remaining special
treaty Indian fishery allowing treaty Indians to fish whenever U.S. Convention waters
were open to any fisherman. Affidavit of William L. Sullivan, Jr., Record, vol. 31, doc.
no. 1187 at 3, (filed July 23, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D.
Wash. 1975). The State Department position was that such a fishery would not harm
proper escapement or proper division of the catch and that its effect on the Commission's program would be de minimus. Id.
86. See Appellant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay at 10 (filed Aug.
15, 1975), United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978). This Fisheries
order conformed the regulations to the modified injunction, United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 1975), discussed in note 85 supra, by deleting
the special five-day-per-week treaty Indian fishery in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. See
also note 88 infra.
87. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, No. 52881 (Wash. Super. Ct., Thurston County, Aug. 1, 1975) (amendment of preliminary injunction of July 23, 1975).
88. Fisheries Order No. 1237 (Aug. 1, 1975), Record, vol. 32, doc. no. 1260, attachment (filed Aug. 12, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash.
1975). The federal court injunction ordered the Director of Fisheries not to allow any
non-Indian (more accurately, all-citizen) fishing until special treaty Indian fishery regulations were enacted. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. June 26,
1975). The state court injunction enjoined the Director from issuing any regulations
contradictory to the Commission regulations. See cases cited in notes 84 & 87 supra. By
suspending his previous orders, the Director essentially removed the state from its enforcement role, see note 58 supra, since there was no longer any state law to enforce and
the state officers were never authorized to act as federal enforcement officers pursuant
to 16 U.S.C. § 776d(b) (1976). Thus, the Director was neither "allowing" all-citizen fishing in contempt of the federal court order nor issuing regulations in contempt of the
state court. However, the Director was still arguably in contempt of the federal court
for failing to promulgate special treaty Indian fishery regulations as ordered. See notes
78 & 85 supra.
89.
United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 1975) (Record, vol. 32, doc. no. 1240). The basis of this federal court injunction was a finding that
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after issued emergency regulations providing for a special treaty Indian fishery.9 0
B.

The 1976 Season: A Diplomatic Agreement and its Strained
JudicialInterpretation

The approach taken by the United States for the 1976 season
sought to avoid the disagreement, confusion and continuous litigation
which had characterized the 1975 season. Diplomatic efforts were
made far in advance of the season to obtain Canadian approval of
1976 Commission regulations with language drafted broadly enough
to allow domestic implementation of Indian treaty rights. 91 The Canadian government accepted a U.S. proposal that the 1976 Commisit was "necessary, in aid of this [federal] Court's jurisdiction, to protect and effectuate
the judgment of this [federal] Court... pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2283." Id., slip op. at 1.
The federal court also amended its previous findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree to reflect the intervening diplomatic and judicial proceedings. United States v.
Washington, Civ. No. 9213, slip op. at 1-3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 1975) (Record, vol. 32,
doc. no. 1241).
90. Fisheries Order No. 1244 (Aug. 8, 1975), Record, vol. 32, doec. no. 1257, attachment (filed Aug. 11, 1975), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash.
1975). As ordered by the July 16 permanent injunction, as modified on July 30, the state
regulations allowed treaty Indian fishing at treaty sites continuously each week during
the times when U.S. Convention waters were open for any type of gear. See notes 78 &
85 supra. See also Brief of Intervenors-Appellees at 14, United States v. Washington,
573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978).

The State of Washington appealed the district court injunctions issued during the
1975 season, but this appeal was recently dismissed as moot. United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir. 1978). This appeal was rendered moot by the fact that the
1975 regulations of the Commission are now fully superceded and the enforcement of
existing and future regulations is no longer entrusted to Washington State officials.
Therefore, injunctions against state officials are not likely to recur in the context of the
Sockeye Convention fishery. Id. The State of Washington has petitioned for and has
been granted certiorari by the United States Supreme Court to review this Ninth Circuit
decision as well as others. Washington v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 277 (1978); Washington v. Washington State Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978); Washington v. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n, 99 S. Ct. 276 (1978).
91. These efforts were prompted by a telegram from the Commission to the two national governments advising them that the Commission had reached an impasse on
adoption of recommended 1976 regulations. [1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FiSHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 3 (1977).
At a January 14, 1976, meeting between representatives of the U.S. Departments of
State, Commerce, and Interior, it was agreed to seek Canadian assent to a proposal in-

cluding certain broadly drafted language in the 1976 Commission regulations. It was
felt that this approach, using language that would not on its face purport to allocate the
U.S. catch, would be compatible with the Canadians' extreme reluctance to adopt any
regulations making reference to United States Indians. Affidavit of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Department of State official, at 2-3 (April 9, 1976) (on file with Washington Law

Review).
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sion regulations be qualified by the following language: "Insofar as
the foregoing regulations prescribe the type of gear to be used during
times open to fishing for sockeye and pink salmon, such regulations
shall be implemented to the extent permissible under the law of the
92
Parties."
This broad language became part of the 1976 Commission regulations, but was subject to the understanding that it would be narrowed
in its domestic application, 93 and would prohibit all fishing during periods when Commission regulations prohibited fishing with all types
of gear. 94 Pursuant to this understanding, the United States published
the regulations with a preamble explaining the extent to which such
regulations would be applicable to treaty Indian fishermen. 95 Thus,
the 1976 season opened under regulations understood to limit all-citizen fishing to the open periods specified for each particular gear-type
(e.g., gill nets, reef nets, purse seines, and trollers) and to limit treaty
96
Indian fishing with any gear to all such open periods.
Although this scheme for implementation of Indian treaty fishing
rights provided the treaty Indians with an expanded fishery not available to other fishermen, it failed to compensate for the large catch dif-

92. Affidavit of Rozanne L. Ridgway, supra note 91, at 5. Canadian approval "was
based upon an understanding that U.S. authorities would take appropriate actions before the commencement of the 1976 IPSFC control period, in order to ensure that
IPSFC regulations would be clearly delimited and would be adequately enforced." Id.
at 4. "Based on their mutual understanding of the meaning and intended effect of the
words to the extent permissible under the law of the Parties, Canada and the United
States ... instructed their respective Commissioners that gear regulations for 1976 be
qualified by the insertion of these words." Id. See Letter from Rozanne L. Ridgway to
Donald R. Johnson (Feb. 17, 1976) (on file with Washington Law Review). For an account of the diplomatic negotiations, see Affidavit of Rozanne L. Ridgway, supra note
91, at 2-6.
93. [1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1977). See note 92
supra.
94. Aide-Memoire from United States to Canada at 2 (Feb. 17, 1976) (on file with
Washington Law Review).
95. 41 Fed. Reg. 22,392-93 (1976).
96. For example, in U.S. Puget Sound Convention waters for the week of July 18 to
July 24, the open periods for non-Indian fishermen started with gill nets from 7 p.m.
Sunday through 9:30 a.m. Monday, overlapped by purse seines from 5 a.m. through
9:30 p.m. Monday and reef nets from 3 p.m. through 9:30 p.m. Monday. The gill nets
were allowed to resume from 7 p.m. Monday through 9:30 a.m. Tuesday, followed by
overlapping periods again for the reef nets and purse seines. The result of this overlapping scheme was that there was non-Indian fishing of one type or another continuously
from 7 p.m. Sunday through 9:30 p.m. Tuesday. [ 1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES

COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1977). The gear-flexibility language of the regulations, see note
92 and accompanying text supra, thus allowed treaty Indians to fish irrespective of gear
type during this period of continuous U.S. non-Indian fishing.
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ferences attributable to the relative fleet sizes. 97 The treaty Indians
subsequently pressed the district court for an even more expansive
fishery based upon a strained interpretation of the 1976 diplomatic
98
agreement and corresponding Commission regulations.
Without considering the practicalities which made the interpretation unreasonable,9 9 the federal district court implemented the treaty
97. The 1976 scheme roughly doubled the treaty Indian fishing time over that which
resulted in a 1.4% share of the 1975 U.S. Convention harvest. It is uncertain whether
this gives treaty Indians their treaty-guaranteed opportunity to catch half of the harvestable Fraser River salmon which pass through the Indians' treaty sites. This uncertainty
stems from the lack of a determination of just what proportion of the returning salmon
pass through treaty fishing sites, see note 56 supra, and the further difficulty of comparing harvest to the opportunity to harvest. Clearly, if the treaty Indians were allowed an
opportunity to fish when half of the harvestable fish were passing through their fishing
sites, then they would have been given their treaty opportunity irrespective of whether
they actually harvested that half or not. See generally note 56 supra and note 201 infra.
98. The Indian interpretation was premised on the fact that the Commission did not
regulate, and therefore "allowed" all-citizen commercial troll fishing on the coastal U.S.
Convention waters. For a discussion of the reasons the Commission does not attempt to
regulate these waters, see note 99 infra. Since the Commission "allowed" this all-citizen
fishing, the treaty Indians reasoned that the 1976 Commission regulatory scheme, permitting treaty Indians to fish whenever any U.S. gear was allowed to operate in U.S.
Convention waters, permitted a seven-day-per-week treaty Indian fishery in Convention waters. Affidavit of Alvin J. Ziontz, attorney, in motion for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction, Record, vol. 53, doc. no. 2325 (filed Aug. 4, 1976),
United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
99. The troll fishery in offshore U.S. Convention waters is unregulated for several
practical reasons, the foremost being the extremely small incidental catch of sockeye,
consisting of only 0.03% of the total U.S. catch for 1976. [1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7, 29 (1977). Any such regulation would be of little prac-

tical value without some corresponding regulatory scheme in the waters adjacent to the
Convention waters which are not within the authority of the Commission. [1977] INT'L
PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 (1978); Report of Annual Meeting of the
International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, in Vancouver, B.C., at 6 (Dec. 9,

1977) (on file with Washington Law Review). The regulation would also cause serious
enforcement problems due to the great expanses of water involved and the lack ofjurisdiction over foreign nationals. See J. ToMASEVICH, supra note 1, at 28-29. Net fishing
on the high seas has been prohibited in Convention waters since 1957. [1957] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 9, 12, 15 (1958). See [1970] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1971).

The offshore pink salmon troll fishery in Canadian waters has been significant at
times and has prompted the concern of the Commission. [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 3-4 (1978). The Commission has not regulated this fish-

ery to date because it has adhered to its stand that allocation among the various geartypes is not within its Convention responsibilities. See notes 46-48 and accompanying
text supra. Furthermore, the Commission has developed its expertise in the regulation

of net fisheries and tends to feel less competent to regulate the troll fishery. Notes of an
Interview with Donald R. Johnson, Chairman of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, in Seattle, Washington, at 1 (Feb. 14, 1978) (approved by Donald R.
Johnson) (on file with Washington Law Review). The Commission has deferred this

431

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:403, 1979

Indian interpretation with an order providing a five-day-per-week
treaty Indian fishery. 10 0 This order was met with resistance from the
Commission' 0 ' and the United States 10 2 and was subsequently modiproblem to the Canadian government consistent with its respect for the national sovereignty preserved by the Convention. Id. The Commission has indicated that when this
allocation problem becomes a conservation problem, they will act promptly. Id. at 2.
Thus, the federal district court apparently failed to balance the difficulties of Commission regulation of coastal U.S. Convention waters with the fact that there is really no
fishery there to regulate. A comprehension of this offshore fishery in the context of the
1976 diplomatic agreement and understanding would preclude a finding that the Commission regulations "allow" it. Yet, this is the finding upon which the Indian interpretation, see note 98 supra, and the federal court order, United States v. Washington, Civ.
No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 1976), were based.
100. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. July 31, 1976)
(temporary restraining order, Record, vol. 52, doc. no. 23121/2).
101. The Commission issued an emergency order on August 3, 1976, "relinquishing
control over the off-shore troll fishery." [ 1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N
ANN. REP. 7 (1977). This was an attempt to avoid responsibility for "allowing" an
offshore seven-day-per-week non-Indian fishery. In addition:
[I] n the interest of clarification, the Commission amended the exceptions to its
regulations by the addition of the underlined words in the following quotation from
the regulations:
"Insofar as the foregoing regulations prescribe the type of gear to be used during
times open to fishing for sockeye and pink salmon in those parts of Convention
Waters open to net fishing east of the Bonilla-Tatoosh Line, such regulations shall
be implemented to the extent permissible under the laws of the Parties."
Id. This amendment of the regulations through an emergency order is arguably beyond
the authority of the Commission as defined by the Pink Salmon Protocol, supra note 6,
at 1060. The emergency order power was granted the Commission to facilitiate the dayto-day problems that arise with respect to escapement goals and division of catch, and
not to be used as a vehicle for amending the annual regulations that expressly require
the approval of the two governments. If the emergency order was intended to be used
for amendment of the annual regulations, this express approval provision of the Pink
Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, at 1060, would be rendered nugatory. But see D. JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 389 n.97 (1965).
102. Plaintiffs' Motion for Interpretation and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order, Record, vol. 53, doc. no. 2322 (filed Aug. 4, 1976), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1976). See also Memorandum of Makah and Lummi
Indian Tribes in Support of Preliminary Injunction, Record, vol. 53, doc. no. 2343
(filed Aug. 12, 1976), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1976).
The interpretation of the gear-flexibility regulations adopted by the treaty Indians and
the district court in 1976 was never asserted during the 1976 negotiations; nor was it asserted during the 1975 season, when the United States withdrew its approval of the
Commission's gear-restrictive regulations, see note 81 and accompanying text supra, so
as to allow implementation of the court's gear-flexibility plan, see note 78 supra. This,
together with the United States' and the Commission's opposition to this 1976 district
court order, shows that such an interpretation was not intended by either nation. Were
the United States to adopt this interpretation, it would not seem to be acting in accordance with its policy of protecting both treaties and would be blatantly violating the understanding that the broadly drafted gear-flexibility language would be narrowly applied.
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fled to allow a more limited treaty Indian fishery, though still larger
than that anticipated by the diplomatically agreed upon gear-flexibil103
ity language of the 1976 regulations.
To insure proper escapement, the Commission later issued an
emergency order closing, until further notice, the U.S. fishery for the
week commencing August 15, 1976.104 This necessitated an interpretation of the modifed district court order for the situation in which all
fishing is closed in U.S. Convention waters. 10 5 Upon information that
the sockeye run for American fishermen was essentially over and that
the Commission would soon be relinquishing control, Judge Boldt is-

sued a memorandum suggesting mootness. 06 By an agreed order, the
motion for preliminary injunction still pending hearing was terminated, 0 7 and days later the Commission did indeed relinquish
08
control.

In summary, after beginning on a note of diplomatic agreement,
the 1976 season ended with Canadian bitterness stemming from the

103. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. August 5, 1976)
(minute order modifying July 31 temporary restraining order, Record, vol. 53, doe. no.
233 1). This order limited the treaty Indian fishery to three days per week and in the
event of changes in Commission regulations, to one day over and above days permitted
the all-citizen fishery. Id., slip op. at 2. This still is in violation of the understanding that
no treaty Indian fishing would be permitted during periods when U.S. Convention waters were closed to all fishing. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
104. [1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 7 (1977).
105. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. August 19, 1976)
(minute order, Record, vol. 54, doe. no. 2364). This order announced that "[n] ational
interests... require that in the present situation [the] Indian fishery should not be approved by the Court when all American fishing is prohibited." Id., slip op. at I. Furthermore, the order required the parties to "attempt to agree upon a method of providing
the treaty fishermen with an equitable adjustment for their lost opportunities to catch
fish." Id. at 1-2. The federal court eventually ordered an "equitable adjustment" which
depended upon three conditions: (1) that some other treaty tribe invite the tribe to their
traditional areas, (2) that there be additional fish available, and (3) that the treaty tribe
entitled to the adjustment be willing to go long distances from their traditional areas to
fish. The failure of these conditions to occur simultaneously in the remainder of the
1976 season led treaty Indian fishermen to characterize the concept of "equitable adjustment" as "meaningless." Affidavit of Hubert Markishtum, Record, vol. 1, doe. no.
10 (filed June 29, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
State, Civ. No. C77-47 IM (W.D. Wash. 1977). See also United States v. Washington,
Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 1976) (order, Record, vol. 54, doe. no. 2436); Hearing transcript at 227-31 (Sept. 3-4, 1976), United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213
(W.D. Wash. 1976).
106. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. August 23, 1976)
(court memorandum, Record, vol. 54, doe. no. 2375).
107. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. August 25, 1976)
(agreed order, Record, vol. 54, doe. no. 2386).
108.

[1976] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 8 (1977).
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strained interpretation of the 1976 regulations by the American
court.1 0 9

C.

The 1977 Season: A Return to Separate Management

The domestic interpretation of the 1976 diplomatic agreement adversely affected chances for future diplomatic agreement to aid the
United States in implementing Indian treaty rights in a manner consistent with its obligations under the Sockeye Convention. With the
spirit of cooperation dampened, diplomatic negotiations for the 1977
season failed to result in 1977 Commission regulations providing for
domestic implementation of the treaty Indian fishery.1 10
Acting in its role as trustee of the Indian treaty rights, the United
States unilaterally purported to remove from the Commission any authority for regulating U.S. treaty Indians. i"' However, in an apparent
109. During meetings immediately after the 1976 season, the official in charge of
Canadian fisheries was reported to have informally indicated Canadian regret for its cooperation prior to the 1976 season in attempting to ease the difficult position of the
United States. Memo from Alvin J. Ziontz, attorney, to United States v. Washington
case file (October 18. 1976) (on file with Washington Law Review). The Canadian official further indicated that the agreement and strained domestic interpretation of the
1976 regulations would guide the Canadian Government in future decisions as to regulation language. Id. at I.
110. The U.S. Department of State made a series of proposals to Canada. developed by the concerned domestic agencies, which would have allowed increased treaty
Indian fishing through modifications of fishing time for certain gear-types in U.S. Convention waters and a proposed special gill net fishing period in subarea 4B (the outer
Strait of Juan de Fuca). Affidavit of Kathryn Clark-Bourne, Record, vol. 1,doc. no. 5.
attachment 3, at 2 (filed June 27, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 I M (W.D. Wash. 1977). An understanding was
initially reached for insertion of these proposals in the 1977 Commission regulations
and was reflected in a letter from the Department of State to the U.S. Commissioners.
Id. See Letter from Rozanne L. Ridgway to Donald R. Johnson (March 16, 1977), Record, vol. 1, doc. no. 5, attachment 3, at 9 (filed June 27, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 IM (W.D. Wash. 1977).
Subsequent to the aforementioned understanding, the Canadian government informed the United States that it was unlikely that the Commission would adopt the
proposals. See Affidavit of Kathryn Clark-Bourne, supra at 2. "As a result of strenuous
and unanimous objection to the proposal by the Advisory Committee members and subsequent withdrawal of support by the Canadian government, the proposal failed to pass
in the Commission." Report of Annual Meeting of the International Pacific Salmon
Fisheries Commission, in Vancouver, B.C., at 3 (Dec. 9, 1977) (on file with Washington
Law Review). On June 1, the Commission adopted recommended staff regulations
which did not include the U.S. proposals. Id. See also Affidavit of Kathryn ClarkBourne, supra at 3; [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6-7
(1978); 42 Fed. Reg. 30,841 (1977).
111. The United States' approval of the recommended 1977 Commission regulations was qualified by the caveat, "except as to U.S. Indians who are entitled to exercise
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effort to satisfy its Convention responsibilities, the U.S. Department
of Interior implemented a domestic regulatory scheme for the treaty
Indian fishery that was to be coordinated with Commission regulatory
goals of proper racial escapement and division of catch."12 Though
fishing rights by virtue of treaties with the United States." Letter from Robert C. Brewster to Donald R. Johnson (June 17, 1977), Record, vol. 1, doc. no. 5, attachment 3, at
6-7 (filed June 28, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of
State, Civ. No. C77-47 IM (W.D. Wash. 1977); [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 7-8 (1978); see 42 Fed. Reg. 30,841 (1977). Since these annual
Commission regulations require the approval of the concerned governments, Pink
Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, at 1060, the United States felt that by exempting treaty
Indians in its approval of the recommended U.S. regulations, there would be no approved regulations to enforce against treaty Indians. The U.S. Department of State advised the Canadian government in advance that it was considering such a move. "Canada did not object to the State Department's means for implementing the regulations
of Indian fishing." Purse Seine Vessel Owners v. United States Dep't of State, 584 F.2d
931, 933 (9th Cir. 1978). The Sockeye Convention, as amended by the Pink Salmon
Protocol, does not provide any guidelines governing the exercise of the approval function, and it is therefore unclear whether the qualified approval of the Commission regulations operates as claimed by the United States or as a mere "counteroffer" requiring
Commission approval. Because the regulations recommended by the Commission are
applicable to all fishermen, and the United States approved the recommended regulations as applied to less than all fishermen, the United States arguably has approved
something that the Commission has not recommended with the net result being no regulations both recommended by the Commission and approved by the United States for
U.S. Convention waters. This argument was made in Brief for Appellant at 6-7, United
States v. Decker, No. 77-3961 (9th Cir., argued Jan. 10, 1979).
112. The scheme provided for Department of Interior "emergency orders" which
would be coordinated with Commission emergency orders. 42 Fed. Reg. 31,450, 31,452
(1977), revoked, 42 Fed. Reg. 58,744 (1977). See also Defendant's Brief in Opposition
to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Record, vol. 1, doc. no. 5 (filed June 28, 1977),
Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 1M
(W.D. Wash. 1977). "In accordance with an agreement between the United States and
Canada, and the arrangements between the Departments of State, Commerce, and Interior, decisions on in-season adjustments of [treaty] Indian fishing schedules, required
by emergency changes in the Commission's regulations, are made by representatives of
the [National Marine Fisheries Service] and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the
Department of the Interior." R. Thompson, Summary of the 1978 Sockeye Salmon
Commercial Fisheries in U.S. Waters Under the Jurisdiction of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission at 3 (Nov. 1978) (unpublished paper available from
National Marine Fisheries Service, U.S. Dep't of Commerce). Following changes made
by the Commission-either reduction or extension of fishing periods-the representatives discussed changes for the treaty Indian fisheries. After attainment of an agreement,
the Fish and Wildlife Service representative contacted the Northwest Indian Fisheries
Commission which distributed the Department of Interior "emergency order" through
its telephone "hot line." Id. See also U.S. Dep't of Interior, Memorandum of Understanding Between Department of Commerce and Department of the Interior Concerning Regulation of Treaty Indian Fishing for Fraser River Convention Salmon (June 21,
1977) (on file with Washington Law Review).
The domestic regulations issued by the U.S. Department of Interior for treaty Indians
fishing in Convention waters allow one additional day per week over and above that al-
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well-intentioned, this represented a return to separate management,
albeit concerning a different pair of user groups,1 13 still posing the detrimental potential inherent in separate management which the Sockeye Convention sought to eliminate by vesting regulatory responsibil1 14
ity in a single body.
Besides occasioning new litigation, 115 the 1977 season yielded the
first evidence of an adverse impact on the salmon resource, at least
partially attributable to the lack of cooperation in implementing Indian treaty rights and the resultant regression to separate manage1 16
ment.
lowed to non-Indians by the Commission regulations, except in the case of the Makah
Tribe in subarea 4B which is allowed two extra days per week to allow for the smaller
numbers offish which pass through Makah fishing grounds in their migration toward the
Fraser River. Compare 42 Fed. Reg. 31,452 (1977) with 42 Fed. Reg. 30,842-43
(1978). The net result for the 1977 season was that treaty Indians were allowed 31 fishing periods, except the Makahs with 39, compared to 18 fishing periods for the non-Indian fleet. [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 17 (1978). During
the "extra periods," the treaty Indians harvested 196,000 sockeye which amounted to
11% of the total U.S. Convention harvest. See note 133 infra. The "extra days" were
placed at the beginning of the fishing week to provide the treaty Indians with significantly higher catches per landing. Consequently, 57 % of the treaty Indian catch of sockeye was taken on the "extra days." 1977 Preliminary Summary, supra note 54, at 5-6.
The Department of Commerce published the 1977 Commission regulations for
United States Convention waters with a caveat stating that they would not apply to Indians exercising treaty-secured fishing rights. 42 Fed. Reg. 30,841 (1977).
113. Prior to the Sockeye Convention and the advent of Commission regulation in
1946, each nation regulated its respective nationals. The 1977 separate management
scheme imposed by the United States was based upon a treaty/non-treaty dichotomy
(treaty fishermen regulated by United States Interior regulations/non-treaty fishermen
regulated by the Commission), rather than the pre-Convention national dichotomy, see
Part 11-A supra.
114. See note 13 and accompanying text supra. For an account of the complexities
and uncertainties inherent in managing this fishery, see Part II-B-2 supra. In such a
complex fishery, the Commission has proved that successful management requires a single authority responsible for scientific research, development, and regulation.
115. All litigation concerning implementation of Indian treaty rights in Conven-

tion waters had previously occurred as part of the continuing jurisdiction of the federal
district court established in United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 420 (W.D.
Wash. 1974). The new litigation reversed the role of the United States from plaintiff as-

serting the treaty Indian rights to defendant defending them. Compare id. with Purse
Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, 584 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Purse Seine complaint charged that the Department of State could not exclude certain citizens from the jurisdiction of the Commission, and that the Departments of Commerce and Interior lacked statutory authority to adopt regulations which exempted certain U.S. citizens from Commission regulation in waters under the jurisdiction of the
Commission. Complaint Requesting Declaratory Judgment and Permanent Injunction
& Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Record, vol. 1, doc. nos. I & 2 (filed June 24,
1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77471M (W.D. Wash. 1977).
116. The Commission has reported a substantial over-harvest of the Early Stuart
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As in the past two seasons, the Commission resisted the efforts of
the United States to iniplement Indian treaty rights in Convention waters. It issued an emergency order purporting to retain authority over
the treaty Indian fishery. 117 In response, the U.S. Department of State
indicated that the Commission's emergency order could not give the
Commisson authority over the treaty Indian fishery and was thus
118
without effect.
run of Fraser River sockeye salmon attributable to a combination of factors. Report of
Annual Meeting of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, in Vancouver, B.C., at 4-5 (December 9, 1977) (on file with Washington Law Review). One factor
was the difficulty of estimating the catch by U.S. treaty Indians as a result of difficulty
in obtaining Indian catch data promptly. Id. Accord, note 45 supra. Not all of this overharvest is attributable to the catches by treaty Indians on the "extra days" granted them
by the U.S. domestic regulations, but the end result was an Early Stuart spawning escapement of 118,000 whereas the goal had been 300,000. Report of Annual Meeting of
the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, supra at 4. Of the 182,000 fish
deficit, an estimated 102,000 were taken on the "extra days." [1977] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 18 (1978). The efforts to restore the Early Stuart

run to optimum size were set back two cycles or eight years, to the 1969 level. Report of
Annual Meeting of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, supra at 5.
Another major factor was the substantial amount of illegal fishing that occurred primarily in the Fraser River itself. Id.; [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN.
REP. 18 (1978).

Early in the season, the Commission staff had informed the federal court that the separate regulatory scheme set up for treaty Indians would "create severe management
problems for the Commission in subsequent days in order to assure adequate escapement of the Early Stuart run." Affidavit of John F. Roos, Assistant Director of the Commission, Record, vol. 2, doc. no. 14, at 2 (filed June 29, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 1M (W.D. Wash. 1977).
117. At a formal meeting of the Commission on June 27, 1977, it issued an
emergency order stating that the regulations as approved by the Commission for the
1977 season for U.S. Convention waters "apply to all citizens, without exception."
Commission News Release No. 3 (June 28, 1977), Record, vol. 1, doc. no. 5a, exhibit E
(filed June 28, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State,
Civ. No. C77-471M (W.D. Wash. 1977). See also [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES

COMM'N ANN. REP. 6, 13 (1978). In an effort to justify the use of its emergency order
power, the Commission publicly announced that "[t] he Convention does not allow for
two management authorities, and in view of the potential chaotic situation in the fishery, the Commission considered an emergency order was necessary to carry out the provisions of the Convention." Commission News Release No. 3, supra. See generally Pink
Salmon Protocol, supra note 6, at 1060 (Commission emergency order authority). The
Commission also sent a letter to the U.S. Department of State specifying that the "Commission is not aware of any provision in the Convention for alteration of the regulations
by either government" and requesting the authority for such action by theUnited States
in qualifying its approval. Letter from Donald R. Johnson to Robert C. Brewster (June
27, 1977), Record, vol. 1, doc. no. 5a, exhibit D, Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v.
United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 1M (W.D. Wash. 1977). The Commission
requested that the United States adhere to the Articles of the Convention and enforce
any violations of the regulations, stating that any fishing other than as allowed by the
Commission would be in contravention of the Sockeye Convention. Id.
118. Affidavit of Ronald J. Bettauer, Record, vol. 1, doc. no. 5, attachment 2 (filed
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The federal district court shared this view and denied the motion
for preliminary injunction filed by the Purse Seine Vessel Owners Association which had alleged that the Commission's authority over all
fishermen in Convention waters was exclusive.' 1 9 A month further
into the season, a second motion for preliminary injunction was filed,
alleging that the Interior regulatory scheme failed to account for
emergency closures by the Commission.1 20 The federal court rejected
June 27, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State. Civ.
No. C77-47 I M (W.D. Wash. 1977). The affiant, who has responsibility for interpreting
international agreements of the United States relating to fisheries, asserted the view of
the Department of State that the United States has authority under the Sockeye Convention to make a qualified approval of Commission regulations as it did. He also stated
that the Commission's emergency order was not an emergency order within the meaning
of the Sockeye Convention, as amended by the Pink Salmon Protocol. The U.S. position
was that the Commission could not, by labeling its action an "emergency order," circumvent the requirement contained in Article VI for government approval of its regulations. Id. at 2-3. See also note 101 supra.
119. Judge Walter T. McGovern, in denying the motion for preliminary injunction,
issued a memorandum opinion rejecting the plaintiff's contention that Commission
regulations are exclusive within Convention waters and that the United States is therefore obligated to enforce those regulations. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-471M (W.D. Wash. July 5, 1977) (memorandum
opinion on file with Washington Law Review). The opinion states:
It is evident from the language of the Convention that the broad regulatory powers granted to the Commission under Article IV of that Convention are thereafter
vacated in Article VI, which expressly provides that those same broad regulatory
powers are "subject to the approval of the two governments." Without that approval, the Commission's proposed regulations remain just that-PROPOSEDand nothing more.
The ultimate purpose of the Convention is to ensure a proper escapement of the
fishery for propagation purposes and an equal division of the catch by the citizenry
of the contracting nations. The delegated authorities to the Commission point to
those ends and nothing in the language of the Convention can be construed to express or infer any greater purpose.
Therefore, in the opinion of the Court, it must be said that Article VI, as
amended, does not give to the Commission the authority to direct the domestic allocation of the fishery alloted to the United States. ...
It is further the opinion of the Court that the Commission's so-called "emergency
order" adopted by it on June 27, 1977 is of no force and effect because. .. the subject matter of that order, to-wit the domestic allocation of the U.S. fish catch is not
a matter within the delegated authorities of the Commission.
Id. at 3.
This opinion was reiterated when the court entered its formal order. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 I M (W.D. Wash. July
8, 1977) (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying motion for preliminary
injunction, Record, vol. 2, doc. no. 25). See also note 70 supra (finding that an equitable
adjustment in lieu of this order would be impractical).
120. Motion for Preliminary Injunction & Memorandum in Support, Record, vol.
2, doc. nos. 27 & 29 (filed Aug. 10, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-471M (W.D. Wash. 1977).
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the allegation and dismissed the motion, 12 1 and the 1977 season
ended without disposition of the request for declaratory judgment

made by the Purse Seiners in conjunction with their first motion for
injunctive relief.'
D.

22

The 1978 Season: A Continuationof Separate Management
After again failing to secure Canadian approval of direct regulation

of the treaty Indian fishery through Commission regulations, 123 the
United States reverted to its 1977 scheme of qualifying approval of
the recommended Commission regulations and thereby withholding

jurisdiction over treaty Indian fishing from the Commission. As in
1977, the Department of Interior issued separate regulations for
treaty Indians, and U.S. enforcement officials adhered to a dual
scheme of enforcement, enforcing Commission regulations as to nontreaty fishermen 124 and the Interior's less restrictive regulations as to
125
treaty Indian fishermen.
In resistance to this separate management scheme, the Purse Seiners revived their 1977 suit. By agreement of the parties, the plaintiffs
did not respond to the August 1977 summary judgment motion of the
United States, but instead sought leave to file a second, amended
121. The federal district court viewed this second motion as simply a reiteration of
the arguments previously rejected by the court in dismissing the first motion. Purse
Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, C77-471M, slip op. at 2
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 1977) (findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying
motion, Record, vol. 2, doc. no. 33).
The Ninth Circuit has affirmed both orders denying these motions, 584 F.2d 931 (9th
Cir. 1978). The Ninth Circuit's position on the validity of regulations which have been
approved only as to non-Indians remained unclear. The court considered the appellant's
arguments concerning "the traditional judicial unwillingness to intrude into foreign relations matters [sic] the appropriate scope of judicial review of executive discretion in
interpreting treaties, and the appropriate limitations upon the use of equitable relief as
a means of avoiding potential criminal liability." Id. at 934. Because the court felt that
"the real attack [was] upon the decree in United States v. Washington," the interpretation and effect of which were pending before the Supreme Court, the court decided that
"it would be inappropriate ... further to pursue the issues." Id. It merely held that "under the existing law of the Circuit, the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in
denying injunctive relief to the non-Indian fishermen." Id.
122. After the court rejected the second motion, the U.S. Department of State
sought summary judgment denying the request for declaratory judgment made by plaintiffs, Purse Seiners, in their original complaint. Motion for Summary Judgment, Record, vol. 2, doc. no. 37 (filed Aug. 22, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-471M (W.D. Wash. 1977).
123. Notes of a Telephone Interview with Kay Oberly, Attorney with U.S. Dep't of
Justice, in Washington, D.C., at 1 (Oct. 4, 1978), (on file with Washington Law Review).
124. 43 Fed. Reg. 26,737 (1978) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. §§ 371.1-.9).
125. 43 Fed. Reg. 27,187 (1978) (to be codified in 25 C.F.R. §§ 251.1-.21).
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complaint. 12 6 The district court denied the request in all respects except one, allowing the plaintiffs to allege that the Stevens treaties only
secured to treaty Indians a right to fish on an equal basis with other
citizens of the State of Washington. 2 7 The United States subsequently
moved for summary judgment.' 28 The 1978 season ended without
disposition of this motion.
Furthermore, the Purse Seiners initiated another suit.' 29 This new
suit attacked the 1978 regulations in a manner similar to the prior
year's attack on the 1977 regulations.1 30 This new suit is pending.
E.

Summary of U.S. Implementation Efforts

Initial efforts by the United States to implement the Indian treaty
rights in the international fishery occurred in 1975. After failing to
achieve a diplomatic solution, the United States unilaterally modified
its approval of the 1975 Commission regulations and ordered the
State of Washington to implement a special fishery for treaty Indians.
The federal and state courts subsequently spent the summer issuing
conflicting orders as to the authority of the State Director of Fisheries
to implement such a special fishery. The net result was that state regulations authorizing special Indian treaty fisheries were in effect for a
total of only nine days during the season and proved of little benefit in
making any meaningful progress toward providing treaty Indians with
1
their share of the Fraser River fishery.' '
126. Memorandum Supporting Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Record, vol.
2, doc. no. 40, Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State. Civ.
No. C77-471M (W.D. Wash. 1978).
127. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No.
C77-471M (W.D. Wash. May 12, 1978) (order, Record, vol. 2, doc. no. 54).
128. Motion for Summary Judgment, Record, vol. 2, doc. no. 59 (filed Sept. 1,
1978), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77471M (W.D. Wash. 1978).
129. Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Bureau of Oceans and Int'l Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Civ. No. C78-578V (W.D. Wash., filed Sept. 28, 1978).
130. Id. With this new suit, the Purse Seiners accomplished several of the objectives
that they had sought and been denied in their motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint in their 1977 suit, namely removal of certain defendants and the addition of
others, as well as the addition of a claim for damages. Compare id. with Purse Seine
Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 I M (W.D. Wash.
May 12, 1978) (order denying motion for leave to amend in all respects except one,
Record, vol. 2. doc. no. 54).
131. Brief of Intervenors-Appellees at 14, United States v. Washington, 573 F.2d
1118 (9th Cir. 1978). The treaty Indian share of the fishery rose from 1.4% in 1974 to
3.6% of the total U.S. share of the Fraser River sockeye fishery in 1975. 1977 Preliminary Summary, supra note 54, at table 8. Data concerning the increase in pink salmon
catches are not available.
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Diplomatic efforts prior to the 1976 season yielded an understanding between the United States and Canada that allowed implementation of a limited special fishery for treaty Indians. At the urging of the
treaty Indians, the federal court ordered enforcement of a special
fishery that was more expansive in scope than that contemplated by
the diplomatic understanding. This resulted in an increased share of
the 1976 fishery for the treaty Indians, 132 but at the cost of Canadian
bitterness threatening to hamper future cooperative efforts to implement the Indian treaty rights.
Diplomatic efforts failed to provide for Commission implementation of a special treaty Indian fishery for either the 1977 or 1978 seasons. The United States then unilaterally withdrew treaty Indians
from the jurisdiction of the Commission and set up separate regulations providing for a special treaty Indian fishery. This represented a
return to the separate resource management that the two nations
agreed to abolish in the Sockeye Convention. The United States defended this position in the federal courts and, by enforcing its separate
regulations, resisted Commission efforts to retain authority over
treaty Indians. This separate management scheme provided significant increases in the treaty Indian share of the fishery for both seasons. 13 3 The potential evils of separate resource management were
largely unrealized, thanks to the intensive coordination efforts of the
Departments of Interior and Commerce. 134 However, this separate
scheme contributed to the failure in the management of at least one
important race of Fraser River sockeye. 135 Unfortunately, the surprising relative success of the operation of the separate management
scheme in 1977 and 1978136 may divert attention from efforts at
132. 1977 Preliminary Summary, supra note 54, at table 8 (6.7% of U.S. Convention harvest).
133.

Treaty Indians harvested 19.23% of the U.S. share of the Convention harvest

in 1977. Id. In 1978, the treaty Indian share decreased slightly to 18.94%, which was
still within the target of 18 to 20% set by the United States. R. Thompson, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce; National Marine Fisheries Service, Summary of the 1978 Sockeye Salmon
Commercial Fisheries in U.S. Waters Under the Jurisdiction of the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission, at 2, 14 (Nov. 1978) (available from National Ma-

rine Fisheries Service, U.S. Dep't of Commerce). This target was based on various factors; the most significant were estimates of the amount of treaty Indian fishing gear that
would participate in the Fraser River salmon fishery and the recommendation of the

Regional Team of the Federal Task Force on Washington State Fisheries. Id. at 2.
134. See note 112 supra.
135. See note 116 supra.
136. Notes of a Telephone Interview with Kay Oberly, Attorney with U.S. Dep't of
Justice, in Washington D.C., at I (October 4, 1978) (on file with Washington Law Review). The significantly increased treaty Indian opportunity afforded by the separate

United States regulations. 1977 Preliminary Summary, supra note 54, table 1 & figure
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achieving the ultimate solution: regulation of all fishermen consistent
with their domestic rights by one regulatory body, the Commission.
IV.

A.

THE LEGAL INTERACTION OF INDIAN TREATY
RIGHTS WITH A LATER TREATY
Legal Coexistence of the Two Treaties

The focus until now has been on the attempts to implement the Indian treaty fishing rights in the arena of an international commission
created by a subsequent treaty. The assumption has been that the Indian treaty rights were not abrogated or modified by the later Sockeye
Convention. This assumption warrants scrutiny.
Basic constitutional law teaches that a treaty has the same domestic
legal status as an act of Congress. Congress, by the enactment of a
subsequent law, may abrogate or modify a prior treaty as domestic
law. 1 37 This principle is applicable to Indian treaties,1 38 subject to
39
procedural limitations to prevent inadvertent treaty abrogations.'
The focus is upon the intent of Congress in passing the legislation,1 40 and an intent to abrogate or modify a prior treaty must be
clearly expressed.' 41 But the absence of words of abrogation is not deI, should be commended as a giant step in the direction of meeting the United States'
treaty Indian obligations.
137. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-67 (1903); The Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884). "The last expression of sovereign will must control." The
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889). In such a situation, enforcement of
the international obligation, if any, must be found in diplomatic negotiations or an international tribunal.
138. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968); Thomas v. Gay.
169 U.S. 264, 270 (1898); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896).
139. Bennett County, South Dakota v. United States, 394 F.2d 8, 11- 12 (8th Cir.
1968). Indian tribes and individuals may be entitled to be compensated in cash for the
loss of their treaty fishing rights through such abrogation. Menominee Tribe v. United
States. 391 U.S. 404, 407, 413 (1968). See also Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States.
348 U.S. 272, 278 (1955); United States v. Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 52, 57 (1946);
Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1937); United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
140. See, e.g., Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 547-50 (1884).
141. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); United States v. Winnebago
Tribe, 542 F.2d 1002. 1005 (8th Cir. 1976). The law of Indian treaty abrogation was recently analyzed by leading commentators on Indian law who proposed a rule requiring
express legislative action. Wilkinson & Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows upon the Earth"-How Long a
Tine Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601 (1975). Such a rule would permit the United States
to break its solemn promises given to the Indians only after deliberate congressional
consideration on the merits. Id. at 660-61.
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cisive. When subsequent legislation is necessarily inconsistent with a
prior treaty, it is deemed to abrogate the treaty to the extent of the inconsistency. 142 Such abrogation by implication is not favored, and the
Supreme Court will harmonize a later statute with the letter and spirit
143
of a prior treaty to the extent possible.
Thus, the determination whether the Sockeye Convention and its
domestic implementing legislation abrogated the Indian treaty fishing
rights turns on ascertaining congressional intent. The Court has considered three factors as bearing on such intent: the wording, legisla44
tive history, and stated purpose of the legislation.
There are apparently no indications from the legislative history of
the Senate ratification of the Sockeye Convention 4 5 or the enactment
46
of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery Act of 1947 and later amendments
that Congress was even aware of any impact on Indian treaty rights.
The congressional purpose was to implement the provisions of the
Sockeye Convention 147 and in no way suggested abrogating the In148
dian treaty rights.
The only factor arguably supporting an abrogative intent is the
statutory wording that "[i] t shall be unlawful for any person to engage in fishing for sockeye salmon or pink salmon in convention waters in violation of the convention or of this chapter or of any regulation of the Commission.' 49 The general rule is that a statute interms
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property
142.

See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190

(1888); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 616 (1878); Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Seneca

Nation v. Brucker, 262 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
143.

United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924). See Menominee Tribe v.

United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968). This attitude in ascertaining the abrogative
intent of Congress has been summed up by stating that "the intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to Congress." Id.
144. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408-13 (1968). See also
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975); United States v. White,
508 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion).
145. See 80 CONG. Rc. 9576-81 (1936); 74 CONG. REC. 392, 1010 (1930).
146. See 93 CONG. REc. 8358-60, 9284-85 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 729, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in [ 1957] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 13 10-16.

147. The Senate ratified the Sockeye Convention with no debate. 80 CONG. REc.
9576-81 (1936). The congressional purpose to implement the provisions of the Convention can be said to echo the stated purpose of the Sockeye Convention: the protection,
preservation, and extension of the dwindling Fraser River fishery. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
148. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
149. The Sockeye Salmon Fishery Act of 1947, 16 U.S.C. § 776a(a) (1976) (empha-

sis added). All wording in this legislation is in such general "any person" terms. See 16
U.S.C. §§ 776a-776f (1976).

443

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:403, 1979

interests. 15 0 This rule, however, does not apply when the interest
sought to be affected is reserved to the Indians by treaty. 15 1 Thus, the
statutory wording of the Convention implementing legislation involved here also fails to evidence the necessary abrogative intent on
the part of Congress.
The issue of abrogation can best be assessed by comparing the present facts to those in Menominee Tribe v. United States.1 52 In that
landmark case, the Supreme Court refused to construe an act of Congress which terminated the Menominee Indian reservation as abrogating the treaty hunting and fishing rights. 153 It is noteworthy that the
hunting and fishing rights were not even expressed in the Indian
treaty, but were implied by the Court.154 After refusing to allow Indian reservation termination legislation to abrogate implied Indian
treaty rights, it should be clear that the Court would not allow the
general Sockeye Convention legislation containing no particular Indian reference to abrogate the express Indian treaty rights reserved in
the Stevens treaties.
Most likely, the lack of reference to Indian treaty fishing rights in
the legislative history, purpose, and wording can be attributed to congressional ignorance of the scope of the Indian treaty rights, undefined until Judge Boldt's decision. Congress could not have intended
to abrogate those rights, unaware that they existed. On the basis of the
existing law of Indian treaty abrogation and the facts of the present
case, it is not surprising that both the federal district court and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected contentions that the Sockeye
Convention and implementing domestic legislation preempted Indian
150. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
This decision overruled the previous rule that "general acts of congress do not apply to
Indians unless so expressed as clearly to manifest an intention to include them.- Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).
151. In Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, the Court was careful
to note that the language of the congressional enactments involved specifically dealt
with Indian property and that the "lands in question [were] not subject to any treaty between the United States and the Tuscaroras." Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 123 (1960). The treaty/nontreaty distinction has been honored
since Tuscarora. United States v. Winnebago Tribe, 542 F.2d 1002, 1005 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114, 117 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v.
White, 508 F.2d 453, 455 (8th Cir. 1974).
152. 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
153. The Court refused to construe the subsequent legislation "as a backhanded
way of abrogating the hunting and fishing rights of these Indians." Id. at 412.
154. Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated: "Nothing was said in the
1854 treaty about hunting and fishing rights. Yet we agree with the Court of Claims that
the language 'to be held as Indian lands are held' includes the right to fish and to hunt."
Id. at 405-06 (footnote omitted).
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treaty rights to harvest Fraser River salmon. 155 With the coexistence
of the Indian treaty rights and the Sockeye Convention established,
the role of the federal courts in implementing Indian treaty rights
needs to be examined.
B.

Jurisdictionaland PracticalLimitations on the FederalCourts

Any judicial efforts to implement the Indian treaty fishing rights
within the framework of the Sockeye Convention will necessarily be
indirect. The federal courts lack jurisdiction over an international organization and its foreign representatives. 156 Consequently, the courts
are limited to exerting an indirect influence on the international
agency through jurisdiction over either the U.S. representatives 157 or
the federal enforcement agency charged with executing the interna155. See notes 55 & 69 and accompanying text supra.
156. It is a rule of international law that an international organization and its officials have such immunity from the laws of a member state as is necessary for the fulfillment of the organization's purposes as they are stated in the international agreement
creating it and defining its purposes and functions. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§

83, 85-86 (1965). This rule has not been

tested in the United States because the United Nations and most of her international organizations functioning in the United States have qualified for the broad statutory
immunity provided by the International Organizations Immunities Act. 22 U.S.C. §
288-288f (1976). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 83, Comment f (1965). By this statutory immunities law, agencies designated by executive order as public international organizations and persons designated
by their foreign governments to serve as their representatives in such organizations are
immune from domestic judicial process while performing their official duties. 22 U.S.C.
§§ 288a(b), 288d(b) (1976). While other international fisheries agencies have been so
designated, the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission has not been so designated and is therefore not entitled to this statutory immunity. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1976).
Thus, its immunity from judicial process must rest upon the rule of international law, or
upon some domestic judicial doctrine such as the "political question" doctrine discussed
in Part IV-C infra.
These immunities have evolved from traditional concepts of diplomatic and parliamentary immunities, and from recognition of the vital importance of the independent
functioning of international organizations and their personnel in order to achieve their
objectives. United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). These concepts are of importance in the case of the Commission which is a nonpolitical body
which finds itself in the middle of conflicting political pressures from its member nations.
157. It is not doubted that the federal courts would have jurisdiction over the U.S.
commissioners. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 91 (1965). Such jurisdiction is based upon the expectation that a representative of a state is expected to act under instructions from it. Id., Comment a. The provisions of the Sockeye Convention retaining executive authority over the commissioners,
see note 18 supra, reinforce this expectation. Statutory federal district court subject
matter jurisdiction to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty can be
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
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tional regulations. 158 Furthermore, any suit directed against such federal officials must also survive claims that it is really against the
15 9
United States and therefore barred by sovereign immunity.
Compounding these jurisdictional limitations on federal court intervention, the terms of the Sockeye Convention require any Commission action to be supported by two of the three Commissioners from
each nation. 60 Thus, any influence that the federal courts may exert
through orders to the United States Commissioners may be thwarted
by Canadian disapproval. Therefore, in any attempt to implement the
Indian treaty fishery, the federal courts are effectively limited to directing the federal enforcement agency and its officers.
C.

The "Political Question" Limitation on Justiciability

Any pressure that the courts may exert on the federal enforcement
agency and its officers is subject to limitations inherent in the doctrine
of separation of powers. By article X of the Sockeye Convention, the
United States agreed to enact and enforce such legislation as may be
necessary to make effective the provisions of the Convention and the
158. The National Marine Fisheries Service is the federal enforcement agency empowered to authorize officers and employees of the State of Washington to act as federal
enforcement officers. No such authorization has occurred, but state officers have traditionally handled enforcement duties. See note 58 supra. The orders of the federal district court to date have been directed towards these state officers although the federal
statutory mandamus jursidiction is only available to compel federal officers to perform
a duty owed to plaintiffs. In United States v. Washington, the State of Washington and
its officers were compelled to recognize the primacy of the Indian treaty rights over
state law. Jurisdiction there was not based on mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1976), but rather on the original jurisdiction of the federal district court in all civil actions brought by the Indians in which the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp.
312, 328 (W.D. Wash. 1974); 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1976).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) has been construed to confer jurisdiction only to compel the performance of a ministerial as opposed to discretionary act of a federal officer.
United States v. Walker. 409 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1969); Praire Band v. Udall, 355
F.2d 364, 367 ( 10th Cir. 1966). The courts have recognized that the enactment of section
1361 was not intended by Congress to make any substantial inroads on sovereign
immunity and thus was not intended to allow suits against the United States. See White
v. Administrator of General Services Adm'n, 343 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1965); Switzerland
v. Udall, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964); Smith v. United States, 333 F.2d 70 (10th Cir.
1964). Thus, sovereign immunity remains a bar to actions against governmental officials which are in reality suits against the United States unless the official can be shown
to have acted in excess of his authority or in violation of the Constitution in refusing to
perform the duty sought to be compelled. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Malone
v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337
U.S. 682 (1949); CCCO-Western Region v. Fellows, 359 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
160. Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1358.
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orders and regulations adopted by the Commission.' 6' Therefore,
whenever a court compels enforcement activities inconsistent with the
Commission orders or regulations, it is compelling a violation of the
treaty obligation of the United States. Since the conduct of foreign affairs is committed exclusively to the political branches of the government by the Constitution,' 62 any such action would constitute an intrusion into the exclusive political domain in violation of the
constitutional scheme of separation of powers.' 63 It is in this area of
foreign relations that the "political question" doctrine has been most
164
extensively invoked.
The "political question" doctrine recognizes that there are indeed
some rights guaranteed by the Constitution for the violation of which
the courts will not give redress.' 6 5 The doctrine was comprehensively
analyzed in Baker v. Carr.166 In discussing its application in the field
of foreign relations, the Court rejected the notion that all questions
touching foreign relations were "political questions.' 67 The Court indicated that in foreign relations cases the doctrine requires a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed in terms of the history
of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to ju-

161. Id. at 1359. Article VIII reiterates the enforcement obligations. Id.
162. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, ci. 3, art. II, § 2, cl.2; Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 320 (1936); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-50 (1972); W.
WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 77-78 (1908).

163. Although there has been some question about the relative roles of the executive
and legislative branches in disregarding our treaty obligations and committing other violations of international law, the courts have recognized that it is not for the judiciary to
prevent another branch from terminating or breaching a treaty. Chae Chan Ding v.
United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1889); L. HENKIN, supra
note 162, at 167-71.
164. L. HENKIN, supra note 162, at 210. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13
(1962). But see Henkin, Is There A "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597,
612 (1976) (suggesting there is no special "political question" doctrine of judicial abstention in foreign affairs cases).
165. Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824, 828 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), rev'd, 369 U.S. 186
(1962). The Supreme Court did not reject the "political question" doctrine when it
stepped into what had formerly been the exclusively political domain of legislative apportionment in Baker v. Carr; it merely rejected the application of it to that case. The
Court stressed the need for a case-by-case analysis, rejecting the lower court's labeling
of any case involving apportionment as a "political question." 369 U.S. at 208-11, 216.
The Court recognized "the impossibility of resolution by any semantic cataloguing." Id.
at 217.
166. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
167. Id. at 211.
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dicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific
168
case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action.
The issue here is whether the "political question" doctrine precludes the federal courts from protecting Indian treaty rights by compelling either the U.S. Commissioners or enforcement officials to act
in possible derogation of the treaty obligations owed Canada pursuant
to the Sockeye Convention. 6 9 Application of the "political question"
doctrine to potential judicial implementation of the treaty fishing
rights in the international fishery will show that the courts may act,
but only in a manner consistent with the directives from the political
branches.
1.

The historicalcommitment of treaty rights and obligations

In the conduct of foreign relations, the power to act is distributed
between the executive and legislative branches, some belonging to the
President, some to Congress, and some to the President and the Senate. 170 Historically, the political branches have managed all policy regarding treaty obligations and it is they, not the courts, who authorize
activities that affect those obligations. 171 Thus, it is a long-established
practice that the courts do not take actions that constitute treaty
violations without prior authorization from the political branches.
2.

Susceptibility to judicialhandling

By ordering enforcement activities contrary to Commission regulations, a court would be engaging in the regulation of the fishery. An
understanding of the complexities and uncertainties inherent in regulating this fishery 172 compels the conclusion that the courts are inca168. Id.
169. Rather than evaluating each specific issue that the district court has faced and
reacted to during its attempted implementation of the treaty rights, this comment limits
the inquiry to this general question which underlies the specific issues raised.
170. L. HENKIN, supra note 162, at 32. Some of the powers can be exercised by either the President or the Congress and some require the joint authority of both. Id. The
President, either personally or through his appointed officers, has the power to assert violations of international law rights, stake out new claims for the United States, waive
rights arising from a breach of international law, disregard international law obligations, and commit other violations of international law. Id. at 39, 48-49. Congress has
the power to effectively breach treaties by passing inconsistent subsequent legislation.
See note 137 and accompanying text supra.
171. See L. HENKIN, supra note 162, at 170-71.
172. By requiring enforcement officers to enforce broader regulations for Indians
than promulgated by the Commission, the court is itself regulating the fishery. The diffi-
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pable of this scientifically oriented regulation. Furthermore, the
courts do not possess the data acquisition and handling capabilities
necessary to monitor the size and racial composition of the returning
runs of salmon. It is on such monitoring that effective regulation depends.' 7 3 Even assuming that a court had the necessary data on which
to act in ordering enforcement activities, the dilatory nature of the judicial process would prove incompatible with the prompt adjustments
frequently necessary for sound regulation of the fishery.' 7 4 It should
be clear that the management of this fishery is not susceptible to judicial handling but rather requires scientific expertise and the ability to
apply this expertise with a minimum of delay.
3.

Possible consequences ofjudicial action

The potential consequences of judicial action are two-fold: an effect on the resource and an effect on Canadian-American foreign relations. Without the necessary data acquisition and handling capabilities, a court would be unable to monitor the effects of its orders on the
resource, and would also lack the scientific basis for sound regulatory
orders. Compelling action contrary to Commission regulations may
breach both the express terms and purpose of the Sockeye Convention. 175 When the judicial action is contrary to the Convention or diplomatic agreements, it may also have a detrimental impact on future
76
relations with Canada, at least in the area of fisheries.'
Of course, if a court is merely following directions from the political branches, the responsibility for any breach lies where it constitutionally belongs, in the political branches. To date, the federal court
involved in this foreign affairs problem has respected the executive
culties of regulating the Fraser River salmon fishery have been discussed earlier. See
Part II-B-2 supra. Although at present the impact of such separate Indian regulation

would be minimal because of the relatively small and inefficient Indian fishery, see note
60 supra, such impact can be expected to increase as a result of the federally funded

buy-back program which will result in a proportionately increased Indian fishery. See
generally note 187 infra.
173. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
174. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
175. Articles VIII and X of the Sockeye Convention require the United States to

pass and enforce appropriate legislation to effectuate the Commission regulations.
Sockeye Convention, supra note 6, at 1359. Compelling enforcement activities incon-

sistent with the Commission regulations would be a literal breach of these express terms.
A court's inability to effectively regulate this complex fishery and weigh the impact of
its actions would be inconsistent with the stated conservation purpose of the Sockeye
Convention. Compare Part IV-C-2 supra with note 17 and accompanying text supra.
176. See note 109, supra. See generally Part III-B supra.
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prerogative with at least one exception. 177
4.

Propriety ofjudicial restraintin the preservation of cooperation

The "political question" doctrine suggests the propriety of the
court's refraining from compelling enforcement activities that would
amount to Sockeye Convention violations, unless such violations are
authorized by the political branches entrusted with making, terminating, and violating our treaties. Although it has been stated that the
doctrine would not be used to avoid adjudicating a claim that a for1 78
eign policy action denies individual liberty under the Bill of Rights,
this limitation should not be extended to a situation, such as this, in
which judicial interference poses an unauthorized threat to foreign relations and also to the management of the resource.
The welfare of the resource itself must not be neglected in the legal
scramble to allocate it. Cooperation has been responsible for the success to date in protecting and enhancing the salmon resource. Such a
complex fishery can be expected to flourish only with the assurance of
continued cooperation. Regardless of what the judiciary might do, it
is incapable of resolving the differences between the United States and
Canada as to the status of native Indian treaty rights and their role in
this fishery. This is an international problem which requires an
international solution. Therefore, the focus must be redirected toward
the executive branch.
V.

SOME EXECUTIVE BRANCH ALTERNATIVES

The Indian treaty rights arose from the solemn promises of our ancestors. To quote Justice Black, "Great nations, like great men,
should keep their word." 179 Since Congress has not chosen to break
these promises by passing abrogative legislation, these treaty rights remain intact and must be recognized and implemented. 180 In the set177. See generally Part III supra. The one definite exception occurred during the
1976 season. The federal court issued orders that were inconsistent with the diplomatic
agreement and understandings negotiated by the executive branch. See Part III-B supra.
178. L. HENKIN, supra note 162, at 215-16. The case for judicial intervention
would be strongest when the government in the exercise of its foreign affairs power directly abridges constitutional guarantees. That is not the case when, as here, treaty rights
are involved.
179. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting).
180. With the lack of State of Washington cooperation blocking implementation of
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ting of an international fishery, the executive branch is the body responsible for discharging the duty of the United States as trustee of
these Indian treaty rights. Some executive branch alternatives need to
be explored.
A.

A Continued Special Indian Fishery Unrecognized by
Commission Regulations-An Inefficient and Risky Solution

Diplomatic efforts to date have failed to result in the direct implementation of Indian treaty rights within the jurisdiction and expertise
of the Commission.' 8 ' This has prompted unilateral action by the
United States, which has drawn Commission protest, 182 and the return to a conservation-deficient regulatory scheme that the Sockeye
83
Convention sought to eliminate.'

Without the coordination of the two management authorities, such
a scheme can only prove detrimental to the resource. 8 4 The necessary
the Indian treaty rights, the Ninth Circuit has stated, "Until the state decides to cooperate, the district court will have to continue protecting the tribes' rights. The state and the
fishers hold the key to lifting federal judicial interference with their fish-management
prerogatives." Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d
1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 1978). In the context of the international fishery, the Canadian government also holds the key.
181. See notes 78, 109- 10 and accompanying text supra. Negotiations prior to the
1976 season resulted in a diplomatic agreement allowing a limited implementation of
the Indian treaty rights. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra. This diplomatic
progress was nullified by the strained judicial interpretation of the agreement by the
federal district court. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
Diplomatic progress has been thwarted more recently by the apparent refusal of the
Canadian Commissioners to implement a proposal agreed upon by the two countries.
Defendant's Brief in Opposition to a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 3-4, Record, vol. 1, doe. no. 5 (filed June 28, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United
States Dep't of State, Civ. No. C77-47 IM (W.D. Wash. 1977). Thus, the most recent
failure to directly implement the treaty Indian fishery through the Commission regulations can be attributed to the Canadian Commissioners' failure to heed the commands
of their government, and to the Canadian government's failure to use the control over
its Commissioners reserved by the Sockeye Convention, see note 18 supra, to implement its desires.
182. See notes 80-83, 100-01 and accompanying text supra.
183. See notes 111-14 and accompanying text supra. See also notes 13-16 and accompanying text supra.
184. See note 13 supra. The necessary coordination would require parallel
harvesting philosophies, id., run prediction and determination techniques, see note 41
supra, as well as a prompt and free flow of catch data between the agencies, see note 45
supra. Coordination is especially important when, as here, one of the agencies does not
have access to the terminal areas (the Fraser River system) where the escapement of the
individual races can be monitored and the regulations modified accordingly. Even with
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coordination has not been demonstrated, nor can it be expected to occur when the Canadians, through either their Commissioners or the
Commission staff, oppose implementation of U.S. Indian treaty fishing rights. The failure of the Commission to include an expanded
treaty Indian fishery in its regulatory thinking will inevitably result in
the overharvest of some races,18 5 some of which are already endangered. Such a threat to the resource exists whether the special treaty
Indian fishery unrecognized by the Commission is the product of a
separate management scheme unilaterally imposed by the United
States, or of the lack of enforcement against treaty Indians of Com186
mission regulations designed to include them.
Without the power to compel Commission recognition of the treaty
Indian fishery in its regulations, the United States must look to the
Canadian government for a viable solution that respects the treaty
rights as well as the conservation purposes of the Sockeye Convention.
B.

InternationalAgreement Within the Framework of the Sockeye
Convention

Management of the fishery under the Sockeye Convention has
proved too successful to discard because of differences in domestic alintensive coordination efforts by one of the regulatory bodies, the refusal of the other
body to include in its regulatory thinking the expected harvest of those not within its
regulations will lead to management failures. See note 186 infra. Furthermore, two
bodies doing what one alone could accomplish represents inefficient utilization of human and technical resources.
185. Had the Commission anticipated the harvest of over 100,000 sockeye on the
treaty Indians' "extra days," they theoretically could have reduced fishing time for the
all-citizen fishery and guarded against overharvest of the Early Stuart run of Fraser
River sockeye. See notes 116 supra, 186 infra.
186. The Commission regulations provide closed fishing periods to allow the desired escapement from the peak of each racial run. See note 41 supra. By not accounting
in its escapement determination for the harvest of any treaty Indian fishery operating
during closed periods, the special treaty Indian fishery would be harvesting from the optimum escapement. This would either result in overharvesting or in Commission emergency orders to close additional periods to compensate for the harvest of fish it intended
to escape. Even such emergency orders would not provide a result consistent with optimum management because they would obtain the escapement deficiency from the latter
part of the racial run, which is less suitable for propagation. Id. In practice, the granting
to treaty Indians of an "extra day" each week has forced the Commission to guard
against overharvest by issuing emergency orders making additional closures of the U.S.
fishery beyond those anticipated by the Commission regulations. This has resulted in a
reduction of fishing time for the all-citizen fishery. Affidavit of Paul L. Anderson &
Commission News Release No. 9 dated July 15, 1977, Record, vol. 2, doc. nos. 30 & 31
(filed Aug. 10, 1977), Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. United States Dep't of State,
Civ. No. C77-47 1M (W.D. Wash. 1977).
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location policies and lack of defined mechanisms for allowing each
nation to pursue its own policy free from the influence of the other
nation. The problem could be mitigated by an international agreement setting limits on the number of licenses issued for participation
in the fishery.
Such a solution would surely be politically unpopular in the established but overdeveloped fishing industry. Even so, it would be a long
overdue measure from the standpoint of conservation. 187 It would
also reduce the number of days each week that the fishery would need
to be closed to fishing, 18 8 a result that is economically sound because
it would represent greater utilization of the more limited number of
vessels. 189 The large imbalance between the treaty Indian and the all187. The Commission has recognized for over 20 years the detrimental impact that
an overdeveloped fishery has on the quality of its management and hence on the re[1955]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 12, 30 (1956). It has appealed to the
source. [1956] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 22 (1957);

national governments to bring the intensity of the fishing pressure to a "rational stan-

dard." [ 1961] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (1962).

The governments have been slow in responding. The United States has recently provided federal support to a recently enacted State of Washington gear-reduction program which authorizes the Department of Fisheries to purchase fishing vessels, gear,
licenses, and permits. WASH. REV. CODE § 75.28.500-.540 (1976 & Supp. 1977). This
buy-back program depends on federal funds. Id. § 75.28.535 (Supp. 1977). It operates
in conjunction with the state moratorium on issuance of new commercial fishing licenses. Id. § 75.28.450 (1976 & Supp. 1977). The legislature initiated these programs
because it realized that the overdeveloped fishery resulted in great economic waste and
prohibited conservation programs from achieving their goals. Id. §§ 75.28.450 (1976 &
Supp. 1977), .500 (Supp. 1977).
Under the buy-back statute, vessels purchased by the state are auctioned off subject to
the condition that they not be used for commercial fishing in the State of Washington.
Id. § 75.28.520 (1976). Treaty Indians petitioned the federal court for a determination
of whether treaty Indian purchases of these auctioned-off boats would be subject to the
use limitations imposed by the state. The federal court decided that treaty Indians were
not subject to such conditions. United States v. Washington, Civ. No. 9213 (W.D.
Wash., Dec. 22, 1976) (order, Record, vol. 59, doc. no. 2715). The state subsequently
suspended the buy-back program because of management shortcomings, but the program is expected to resume. See State Audit Hits Boat Buy-back, Seattle Times, Nov. 4,
1978, § E, at 6.
188.

See generally [1955] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 12

(1956).
189. The economic waste of an overdeveloped fishery is apparent by viewing the
hundreds of fishing vessels that are confined to port five days a week or more by the regulations and emergency orders necessary to obtain the required escapement. The Commission has considered the economic plight of the individual fishermen in the overdeveloped fishery, but its concern is limited by the Convention to the resource and not to such
political issues. [ 1961] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 16 (1962). The

State of Washington has recognized the "great economic waste" resulting from the
"over-abundance of commercial salmon fishing gear in our state waters." WASH. REV.
CODE § 75.28.450 (1976). The state has taken measures to reduce the amount of com-
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citizen fleets, which causes the need for an expanded treaty Indian
fishery, 190 would also be reduced. By taking the further step of appropriating funds to replace the less efficient Indian fleet with the more
efficient boats that would be idled by the overall fleet reduction, the
United States would go far toward fulfilling its obligation to provide
the treaty Indians with an opportunity to harvest their share.
By adopting this politically delicate course of action, the United
States would be acting consistently with its stated intention to honor
both treaties1 91 and would do so without requiring the Canadians to
expressly recognize special Indian treaty rights, a sensitive issue in
Canadian policy toward native Canadian Indians. t92 The net result
mercial gear. See note 187 supra. See also Suffia, Who is Right?, Seattle Times. Apr. I.
1978, § A, at 10.
190. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
191. See note 64 supra.
192. Canadian reluctance to cooperate in making Commission regulations that specifically recognize United States Indian treaty rights apparently stems from fear that
their native Indians will demand similar rights. Oral Deposition of Thor C. Tollefson.
United States Commissioner, at 29 (filed June 11, 1974), United States v. Washington,
Civ. No. 9213 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
In general, the narrower scope of Canadian Indian fishing rights in the Fraser River
fishery is attributable to both the lack of Indian treaties and the exercise of legislative
authority over Indians by Parliament. The province of British Columbia is primarily a
nontreaty area with few very limited exceptions. See Sanders, Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 38 SASK. L. REV. 45, 49, 52 (1974). Thus, the source of any special fishing
rights or privileges generally is Parliament, which has exclusive legislative authority
over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians." British North American Act, 1867,
30 & 31 Vict.. c. 3, § 91(24), reproduced in Appendices to CAN. REV. STAT. at 215
(1970). In exercising this authority, Parliament has provided that" [s] ubject to the terms
of any treaty and any other Act of the Parliament of Canada. all laws of general application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians in the province." Indian Act, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 1-6, § 88 (1970).
Because British Columbia is primarily a nontreaty area, its Indians are subject to the
laws of general application in force in British Columbia, which include Commission
regulations implemented domestically by the Governor in Council. Pacific Salmon
Fisheries Convention Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. F- 14, § 4 (1970). But it should be recalled
that Commission regulations apply only to Convention waters and the greater part of
the Fraser River system is not classified among Convention waters. See note 19 and accompanying text supra. Therefore, only fishing by Canadian Indians in Canadian Convention waters is subject to Commission regulations.
Fishing in Canadian non-Convention waters is subject to other laws of general application in force in British Columbia. The only other major national law dealing with
fishing is the Fisheries Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. F-14 (1970), which applies to Indians.
Sanders, supra at 47. Certain of the regulations under the Fisheries Act make special
provisions for Indians. There are separate regulations for each province, and the regulations are in fact drafted by the province involved and not by Parliament. Id. British Columbia regulations permit Indians to fish for food for themselves and their families, subject to restrictions that may be written into the Indian's license. Id. Consequently,
Canadian Indians fishing for Fraser River salmon generally enjoy special rights only in
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would be improved management of the resource, increased economic
efficiency in the harvest, and an expanded treaty Indian opportunity
to share in the harvest. These positive results, however, must be balanced against the domestic problems inherent in the sudden loss of
employment of thousands of non-Indian fishermen.
It should be pointed out that although Canadian agreement in such
a fleet reduction program would be desirable for the resource, the
United States could still achieve greater treaty Indian opportunities
through reduction in only the United States fleet. This is so because
the Commission promulgates separate regulations for the American
and Canadian fisheries; and American reduction would simply result
in fewer closed periods for only the American fishery.
C.

Renegotiation of the Sockeye Convention-Modernizationto
Meet Today's Problems

Difficulty in implementing the Indian treaty rights stems from the
fact that rights of such scope were not contemplated at the time of the
Sockeye Convention. 193 Consequently, no provision was secured by
the United States to facilitate implementation. Renegotiation of the
Sockeye Convention could provide an opportunity, to remedy this and
other problems that were not contemplated originally.
In renegotiating, the Commission's scientific and investigative powers should be preserved or expanded. This is where the Commission
the non-Convention waters and only to the extent of a subsistence fishery. See [ 1953]
INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 19 (1954).

This Canadian Indian fishery along the Fraser River has increased to the point of
causing Commission concern. [ 1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP.
20 (1978). This concern derives from the fact that the Commission regulates Convention
waters to provide a gross escapement into the river that, after the Canadian Indian fishery, will result in the necessary escapement. [1974] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES
COMM'N ANN. REP. 18 (1975). When this fishery is not kept in check by provincial officials and exceeds Commission estimates, it cuts directly into the necessary escapement.
In 1977 this Canadian Indian fishery harvested 246,528 sockeye, compared to the total
U.S. treaty Indian catch of 320,728 sockeye. Compare [ 1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 20 (1978) with 1977 Preliminary Summary, supra note 54,
table 2.
193. Neither the Senate ratification of the Sockeye Convention nor Congress' enactment of implementing legislation indicates an awareness of an impact on Indian
treaty rights. See notes 132-35 and accompanying text supra. In all probability, the Indian treaty rights were thought of as only exempting treaty Indians from state licensing
fees and not from state regulations. See generally Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 68 1,
684 (1942); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). Thus, it is unlikely that Congress considered that it would be necessary to allow treaty Indians to fish during periods
otherwise closed to fishing in order to secure their treaty share.
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has made its greatest impact and it must be the basis for any sound
regulation of the fishery.1 94 In the present Convention scheme, the
Commission has consistently denied responsibility for making the domestic allocation of each nation's share of the fishery.1 95 However,
the exercise of its regulatory powers with the required approval of
both nations has prevented the United States from achieving its own
desired domestic allocations through the Commission. One plausible
solution would be to supplant the Commission's regulatory powers
with a more limited power to set the domestic harvest quotas.1 9 6 The
Commission could continue to engage in investigation and data acquisition to provide the necessary basis for setting quotas of harvestable
fish for each race.1 9 7 By continually evaluating daily catch data, the
Commission could adjust its quotas for variations in the run sizes, racial compositions, run timing, and other factors. This much at least
would not be a departure from present practice. 198
Allowing each nation to regulate the allocation of its share of the
quotas would seem to be a radical departure from the Sockeye Convention; however, such independent allocation is parallel to the present operation of the Commission, 9 9 and consistent with the desired
retention of sovereignty over each nation's share of the fishery.2 00
This suggested scheme would result in a unified management authority dictating research, investigation, and harvesting policies while
194. See note 35 and accompanying text supra. See also [ 1950] INT'L PAC. SALMON
FISHERIES COM M'N ANN. REP. 3 (1951).
195.
See, e.g., [1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 13 (1978);
[1975] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 4 (1976); [1974] INT'L PAC.
SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 6 (1975).

196. In setting the quotas of harvestable fish from each race, the Commission could
also designate the periods during which these fish should be taken and thereby insure obtaining the escapement from the most prolific spawners, which tend to be those fish
coming from the peak of the run. See note 41 supra.
197.
See generally J. CRUTCHFIELD & G. PONTECORVO, supra note 10, at 143. See
also note 41 supra.
198. See note 45 supra.
199. The present scheme provides control over the allocation through the regulations proposed by the Commission which must be supported by the Commissioners of
each nation as well as by the national governments. But the requirement that all Commission action be supported by two of the three Commissioners from each nation provides each nation with a veto over regulations desired by the other for domestic allocation. The proposed quota scheme would retain the same input for each nation into its
regulations and would eliminate the veto power arising from the Commission's
procedural restraints in promulgating regulations.
200. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra. The elimination of a veto
power over the other nation's domestic allocation would guarantee sovereignty by assuring that the domestic allocation of each nation's treaty share of the resource would be
totally controlled by that nation.
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leaving each nation with exclusive authority over its own regulations
and enforcement. This would provide the necessary flexibility for
each nation to allocate its share of the resource within the dictates of
its respective domestic law, while retaining the major benefits of a
unified management authority.
A better solution could be achieved by more specifically directing
the Commission's use of its regulatory powers. The two nations could
agree to make their domestic allocations part of the Commission's responsibilities. 20 ' Furthermore, all fishery groups harvesting Fraser
River salmon could be brought within the Commission's authority by
the expansion of the Convention waters to include the Fraser River itself.20 2 This would provide the Commission with direct control of all
elements of the fishery, desirable from a viewpoint of conservation,
and with specific directions for the exercise of that control which
would result in satisfying the domestic requirements of both nations.
These proposals represent only some of the possible solutions.
There are undoubtedly many others that would be consistent with
conservation principles and the domestic legal constraints of each nation. Renegotiation would provide the flexibility to consider many solutions, thereby making consensus possible.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Fraser River salmon fishery is a vitally important food and
economic resource whose future depends on sound management. The
international nature of the salmon migrations makes such management dependent upon future cooperation between the United States
and Canada. This cooperation has been and may continue to be
threatened by the steadfast assertion of their differing policies with respect to their native Indians. 203 Neither nation should be allowed to
dictate the other's policy, yet the differing policies cannot be allowed
to threaten the resource management.
201. The Commission would be much better qualified than the courts to quantify
the share of fish to which the treaty Indians are guaranteed access by Judge Boldt's deci-

sion. The Commission staff would be able to identify what particular migrations of fish
pass through traditional Indian fishing sites. This would allow for a more refined definition of the Indian treaty rights. See note 56 supra.
202. This would provide the Commission with control over the Canadian Indian
subsistence fishery, see note 192 supra, and the large amounts of illegal fishing that occur along the hundreds of miles of Fraser River. This direct control over two of the
sources of management problems would facilitate sound management. See generally
[1977] INT'L PAC. SALMON FISHERIES COMM'N ANN. REP. 15-20 (1978).

203.

The policies of Canada with respect to its native people are briefly discussed in

note 192 supra.
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To find a solution to this highly volatile problem, the beneficiaries
of this resource, the two nations and their citizens, must look beyond
the judicial process. The courts are incapable of providing a viable solution. They are limited jurisdictionally, technically, and by the "political question" doctrine. Their voice is confined to an echo of the
branch of government charged with maintaining foreign relations and
international cooperation.
The Indian treaty rights do exist. They have not been abrogated by
Congress and are unlikely to meet such fate. However, their implementation in this international fishery must not be hastened at the expense of Canadian alienation. Unlike the judicial expediency sought
in the school desegregation cases after Brown v. Board of Education,20 4 the prompt implementation of these heretofore unrecognized
treaty fishing rights in a manner consistent with sound resource management depends upon international as well as domestic action. The
governments must cooperate in taking the necessary steps to arrive at
a solution that will guarantee the future of this resource without compromising the independence of their respective Indian policies. The
solutions proposed in this comment may not be definitive, but they do
indicate the range of possibilities wherein an acceptable solution can
be found.
Kenneth E. Petty

204. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). After issuing this substantive
decision, the Court heard arguments on the proper remedy to implement the unpopular
decision and decided that the district courts' equitable powers were appropriate to the
local nature of each school district's problems. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294
(1955). The Court instructed the lower courts to "make a prompt and reasonable start
toward full compliance" with the decision. Id. at 300. The Court contemplated district
court action "with all deliberate speed" to admit the students who had previously been
denied admission on the basis of race. Id. at 301.
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